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REGULATING THE BUSINESS OF CULTURE:
THE ABANDONED SHIPWRECK ACT -
CAN PRESERVATIONISTS, SALVORS,
AND DIVERS SAIL IN CALMER WATERS?
I must go down to the seas again, to the lonely sea and the sky,
And all I ask, oh august Court, is a case to steer me by.1
INTRODUCTION
When Erasmus mused that "[a] common shipwreck is a source of
consolation to all" . . . he quite likely did not foresee inconcinnate
free-for-alls among self-styled salvors. Without doubt the Dutch
scholar also could not imagine legal brawls involving self-styled
'finders' from Ohio, British and American insurance underwriters,
an heir to the Miller Brewing fortune, a Texas oil millionaire, an Ivy
League university, and an Order of Catholic monks. Yet that is
what this case involves, with the prize being up to one billion dollars
in gold.2
A rather unusual phenomena, an advance in technology and an in-
creased interest in sport diving and underwater adventurers, resulted
in access to the deepest, darkest depths of the ocean, otherwise un-
navigable because of its pitch blackness and unknown dangers, for
1. Herbert Baer, Preface to the Third Edition to ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT
(3d ed. 1979).
2. Columbus-America Discovery Group v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sail-
ing Vessel, 974 F.2d 450, 454 (4th Cir. 1992). With the recent interest in lost shipwrecks and the
expanding technology, several diverse groups have shown an increased interest in hunting for
these lost treasures. In the case of the Columbus-America, such notables as Harry John, the heir
to the Miller Brewing Company, and Jack Grimm, a Texas oil multi-millionaire who also
searched for Noah's Ark, the Loch Ness Monster, and the Titanic, and a Catholic monastic order
who received the rights to the Columbus-America when Grimm believed them to be worthless,
were interested in the recovery of the ship. Id. at 457.
In August of 1857, four hundred passengers, including recently wealthy prospectors, the infa-
mous California Judge Alonzo Castle Monson, who resigned from the bench after losing his
house and all his possessions in a poker game, and a well known former dance hall girl known as
"the notorious Jenny French" boarded the S.S. Sonora for San Francisco. Along with passenger
gold, the ship also contained about $1,600,000 (an 1857 value) of gold being shipped from Cali-
fornia merchants, such as Levi Strauss, to New York Banks. Id. at 455. After reaching Panama,
many of the travelers and most of the gold boarded the Central America, which entered a hurri-
cane that eventually extinguished the fires in the ship's boilers causing the pumping system to
fail. Id. at 456. After thirty hours in which every male passenger systematically bailed water out,
the Columbus America sank. Id. Only 153 passengers survived: all the women and children,
save one, fifty men who, after the ship sunk had managed to float to the top and were found nine
hours after the sinking, and a lifeboat containing three men discovered nine days and 450 miles
away from the sinking. Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 456.
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masses of tourists, archeologists, adventure divers, salvors, and trea-
sure hunters. As a result, many historically important shipwrecks,
which remained untouched at the bottom of the ocean for hundreds of
years, are now explored, salvaged, pillaged, and excavated by anyone
who can afford the equipment and possesses a taste for adventure.
In the past decade, these distinct groups have litigated for posses-
sion of recently uncovered treasures under the Abandoned Shipwreck
Act (ASA). 3 In 1987, Congress passed the ASA to protect the cul-
tural resources of the sea in light of the large number of individuals
visiting abandoned shipwrecks. 4 According to the ASA, if a ship is
embedded in state land, submerged in water, and abandoned, the state
receives title. 5 However, if a ship fails to satisfy the ASA require-
ments, then the court determines the proper claimant to title based
upon the law of finds or the law of salvage. 6 By regulating ownership
of ships embedded in state territories, Congress hoped to save the per-
fectly preserved evidence of former cultures lying at the bottom of the
ocean for years while, at the same time, allowing interested individu-
als access to these historic sites. 7
This Comment will address the problem caused by the lack of a
clear definition of abandonment under the ASA for courts to follow,
which, as a result, has become the central issue in most ASA litigation.
In Part II, the history of maritime law with respect to abandonment
and the enactment of the ASA will be reviewed. 8 Second, the goals of
preservation, the central purpose behind the ASA, and the impor-
tance of protecting cultural resources will be examined. 9 Finally, the
major cases discussing abandonment under the ASA will be out-
lined. 10 In Part III, the effects of emerging technology and its costs on
abandonment will be analyzed." Part IV details an alternative stan-
dard for abandonment that gives courts discretion, yet also protects
property law's strong interest in the true owner. 12
3. Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.
4. See infra notes 72 - 84 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 71 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 75 - 77 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 13 - 90 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 91 - 125 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 125 - 225 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 226 - 305 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 306 - 315 and accompanying text.
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THE ABANDONED SHIPWRECK ACT
II. BACKGROUND
The purpose of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA) was to insti-
tute a uniform law for all abandoned shipwrecks in state waters and to
clear up confusion surrounding abandoned shipwreck litigation. Prior
to the enactment of the ASA, however, several state laws and federal
regulations existed to monitor maritime law and the United States'
underwater resources.
A. Traditional Maritime Law
As a result of the unique characteristics of commerce by water and
the hazards of the sea, maritime law traditionally contained its own
legal rules and concepts separate from those of state common law.13
Unlike most legal principles created in the United States, maritime
law commands a worldwide consistency because of the international
implications of maritime commerce. 14 Because oceans and seas con-
nect the entire world, a common worldwide maritime law aids courts
in fair adjudication of these claims.
Admiralty courts typically hear cases regarding commercial endeav-
ors; however, several constitutional and state safeguards govern the
law of the sea. The United States confers original jurisdiction to the
federal courts over admiralty and maritime law cases through Article
III, section 2 of the United States Constitution. 15 After the American
Revolution, no system of national courts existed under the Articles of
Confederation as each state had enacted its own laws, setting up sepa-
rate tribunals for the state and admiralty law. 16 Because conflicting
opinions and a lack of uniform laws plagued the new country, the
Founders created a separate maritime jurisdiction.' 7 "The experience
13. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME 1 (1987).
14. Id. at 1.
Because of this, the laws of the sea were uniform and universal, a characteristic never
completely lost, even in our own times, although it is not true today in anything like the
extent that it then was. Indeed, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that throughout
classical antiquity, through the Dark and Middle Ages, and until comparatively recent
times, the greatest characteristic of maritime law has been that its uniform provisions
were known and enforced in every seaport of every nation.
Id. at 7, (citing F. SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME COMMERCIAL LAW 19
(1930)). See generally DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM: HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE MARITIME LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 67-70 (1970) (discussing interaction of federal and state courts in maritime law).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
16. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 17.
17. Id. "Constitution . . . referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uni-
formly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules
and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would
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of the uncontrolled and divergent activity of these state maritime
courts was largely responsible for the apparently uncontroverted view
among the delegates and drafters of the United States Constitution
that there should be a system of national admiralty courts."'1, Admi-
ralty law holds a unique place in American legal history because Arti-
cle III represents the only instance that the Constitution confers
jurisdiction over an entire subject matter to the federal courts. 19
Congress further strengthened the power of the separate maritime
law system by enacting 28 U.S.C. §1333, which permitted federal
courts to develop a substantive body of general maritime law.20 As a
result, federal maritime law comes from both Congress, in the form of
statutes, and federal common law; hence, state law plays a diminished
role.2' Even today, the United States Supreme Court conscientiously
works to ensure the uniformity of maritime law.22
Prior to the ASA, the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 transferred
ownership of all natural resources and submerged lands, up to three
miles out, to the states in order to further preserve this country's un-
derwater resources.2 3 In addition, twenty-eight states wrote laws de-
tailing the management of shipwrecks in state waters.24 In addition to
the Submerged Lands Act and state created laws, the Secretary of
Commerce has the power, under the National Marine Sanctuary Pro-
gram,25 to designate certain underwater areas as national marine sanc-
tuaries in order to preserve these sites for historical research,
ecological protection, and archeological purposes.26 Unfortunately, in
contrast to the Founders' intentions, conflicts in application and in-
have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed . The Lot-
tawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1870).
18. Schoenbaum, supra note 13, at 17. However, no record of reasoning or discussion exists to
explain why they chose to create a separate jurisdiction for maritime cases because the Founders
drafted Article III during deliberations. Id. at 18 n.9.
19. Id.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000). See also, Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 432) 365, 371 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.).
21. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 61.
22. See also John D. Kimball, Miles: "This Much and No More ... ," in AN ADMIRALTY LAW
ANTHOLOGY 7 (Robert M. Jarvis, ed., 1995). Kimball believes that the Supreme Court under-
stated its role in maritime law in past decisions, "[u]nder the Constitution, the Court has an
equal, if not preeminent, role and is vested with jurisdiction to declare the general maritime
law." Id.
23. See Public Lands: Definitions, 43 U.S.C. §1301, 291 (1994).
24. See Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.
432) 365, 370 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.).
25. Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 432)
365, 370-71 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.).
26. National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-39 (2000).
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consistent judicial determinations between the application of these
state laws and federal admiralty law occurred.2 7
1. Law of Salvage and the Law of Finds
The ASA leaves "abandonment" undefined with the exception of
comments made during committee hearings and advisory regula-
tions.2 8 Under traditional property law, abandonment consists of two
elements: an act of abandonment and an intent to abandon.29 When
determining abandonment in maritime cases, courts found both ex-
press abandonment, such as giving notice, 30 and inferential abandon-
ment when all the circumstances indicate that the owner intended to
abandon.31 Since the passage of the ASA, courts have struggled with
the definition of abandonment, whether it is express or implied. 32
Maritime law itself does not directly define abandonment; instead,
maritime courts look to cases that interpret maritime insurance
claims,33 salvage claims,34 or traditional concepts of property law to
determine if an owner abandoned his ship. 35 An owner does not de-
finitively lose his property rights to a sunken ship unless he abandons
it36 or fails to make a claim within the required statutory period after
recovery. 37
27. See Abandoned Shipwreck Act: Hearings on S.858 Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands,
Nat'l Parks and Forests Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 100th Cong. 251, 252 (1987)
[hereinafter Hearings] (additional material submitted for the Record from the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration). These areas could also include historical shipwrecks. Id.
28. See infra note 85 - 87 and accompanying text. See also 55 Fed. Reg. 50116, 50121 (1990).
29. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property § 11 (1994).
30. See Thompson v. U.S., 62 Ct. Cl. 516 (1926) (holding that the owner abandoned the
sunken ship by notifying the United States Army of the wreck).
31. See Steinbraker v. Crouse, 169 Md. 453 (1935) (applying inferential abandonment). See
also Ervin v. Mass. Co., 95 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1956) (holding that the length of time was central to
finding of abandonment); D. David Lorello, Jr., The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Navigat-
ing Through the Fog, 35 GoNz. L. REV. 75, 77 (2000) (explaining that there are three types of
maritime abandonment in traditional maritime law: (1) owner's express notice, (2) implied from
owner's inaction or lapse of time, and (3) no identifiable owner exists.)
32. See infra notes 125 - 221 and accompanying text. See also Timothy T. Stevens, The Aban-
doned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Finding the Proper Ballast for the States, 37 VILL. L. REV. 573, 583
(1992) (noting that the confusion over abandonment results from difference of American law,
which follows finders keepers, and English law in which the sovereign keeps what is found).
33. H.B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Rights In and Ownership of Wrecked or Derelict Vessels
and their Contents not Cast upon the Shore, 63 A.L.R.2d 1369, 1370 (1959).
34. See Nunley v. Dauntless Colocotronis, 863 F.2d 1190, 1199 (5th Cir. 1989).
35. See Deep Sea Research v. The Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (N.D. Calif.
1995).
36. Chermside, supra note 33, at 1372 (citing De Bardeleben Coal Co. v. Cox, 76 So. 409 (Ala.
Ct. App. 1917)).
37. Chermside, supra note 33, at 1371. See also, Murphy v. Dunham, 38 F. 503 (D.C. Mich.
1889). Therefore, merely finding property at sea does not constitute right to the title of the ship,
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In maritime law, abandonment is usually determined under the law
of salvage or the law of finds, depending on whether the true owner
asserts and proves title. 38 The ASA, however, abolished the law of
finds and the law of salvage as means for adjudicating abandoned
shipwrecks. 39 In order to understand maritime abandonment and the
implications of the ASA on maritime law, a review of the law of sal-
vage and the law of finds is necessary.
a. The Law of Salvage
Issues of abandonment usually arise and are best expressed in the
context of the law of salvage. Under the law of salvage, abandonment
follows the traditional property definition: maritime abandonment re-
quires the act of leaving property without the hope or intention of
ever recovering it.40 However, contrary to common law, maritime sal-
vage law grants a reward to a salvor,4 the person who found a lost
vessel and recovered it and its goods from the ocean.42
The "[l]aw of marine salvage developed in response to important
social policies, to encourage efforts to save property from destruction
and to discourage embezzlement by salvors. ''43 Originally, salvage
only applied to property in peril at sea. "From the standpoint of the
owner of property, it ... [was] the price of safety" 44 because a dis-
tressed vessel did not merely wait for the goodwill of another ship;
but only a right of possession with title to a reasonable reward for his services. Chermside, supra
note 33, at 1373. See also The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. 762 (D.C. Me 1840). Even if the owner of a
ship has abandoned his title to the insurance company, the ship is not effectively abandoned
because the title has now transferred to the insurance company. See Chermside, supra note 33,
at 1376. Hence, a vessel and its cargo must effectively be abandoned by all concerned. Id.
38. See infra notes 40 - 64 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
40. See 3A, M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 145 (3d ed. 1970).
41. Id. at § 186
42. A salvor is someone who offers his service to save a ship in distress, often he has no other
relation with the ship. A salvor only need to possess intention and ability to rescue a ship in
peril. 68 Am. Jur. 2d Salvage § 38 (2000). Professional salvors, whose primary motive is profes-
sional gain, still receive compensation because the motive is unimportant. Id. at § 37. Some
professional salvors are even awarded a greater amount in compensation because of the expense
necessary to remain ready to perform. Id. See also The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1869). In
Blackwall, the Court held that the factors for determining a salvage award are:
(1.) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service. (2.) The
promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the service and saving the prop-
erty. (3.) The value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service,
and the danger to which such property was exposed. (4.) The risk incurred by the
salvors in securing the property from the impending peril. (5.) The value of the prop-
erty saved. (6.) The degree of danger from which the property was rescued. Id. at 14.
43. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 500.
44. GEORGE CANFIELD AND GEORGE DALZELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA 180 (1983). See also
Protection of Historic Shipwrecks and the National Maritime Museum: Hearings before the Sub-
THE ABANDONED SHIPWRECK ACT
but, instead, an owner relied on the security that another ship desiring
the salvage reward would rescue it.
Two types of salvage exist: pure salvage and contract salvage. Pure
salvage occurs when a salvor voluntarily saves a lost or imperiled ves-
sel. 45 Under contract salvage, which is usually used on sunken ships, a
vessel owner creates a contract with a salvor for the retrieval of his
goods. 46 A salvor can receive payment based on an hourly or daily
rate, regardless of the salvor's success. Alternatively, the salvor can
receive payment conditioned on his success. 47 Although a salvor may
not impose salvage upon an owner and expect a reward, he may sal-
vage an abandoned vessel without the owner's consent.48 The pur-
pose of salvage law is to give the salvor a right to compensation, not
title, even in derelict or abandoned property.49
Viewed as treasure hunters preying on another's misfortune, salvors
developed a roguish reputation. While the drafters of the ASA be-
lieved that application of salvage law to historic shipwrecks resulted in
the destruction of artifacts and the exploitation of historic
landmarks,50 in reality, maritime law punishes salvors for plundering
or damaging cargo or vessels.5 ' "Compensation for salvage services
presupposes good faith, meritorious service, complete restoration, and
incorruptible vigilance so far as the property is within the reach or
under the control of the salvors. ''5 2 It is critical to note that under the
law of salvage the salvor never actually obtains title to the wreck, be-
cause title remains with the owner;5 3 hence, the salvor's primary inter-
est is to keep the property in good condition so that he will receive a
higher reward for his services. A salvor's commercial success depends
comm. on Public Lands and Reserved Water, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Comm., 98th
Cong. 29 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings].
45. BAER, supra note 1, at 575.
46. id.
47. Id.
48. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 504.
49. Id. at 512. See also, Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-298, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 432) 365, 371 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.).
50. See Hearings, supra note 44, at 29-30. The committee compared the plight of historic
shipwrecks to historic land sites at the beginning of the twentieth century, such as Native Ameri-
can sites, destroyed by people scavenging for arrowheads or other valuable artifacts. Id. at 30.
51. Id. at 608. See also Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. 240 (1804) (denying a ship captain his
salvage reward because he embezzled part of the cargo).
52. See Hearings, supra note 44, at 609 (citing Justice Grier's opinion in Cromwell v. The
Island City 66 U.S. 121, 130 (1861)).
53. Lorello, supra note 31, at 77.
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on his ability to safely and effectively harvest artifacts from historic
shipwrecks. 54
b. The Law of Finds
Although not as common, some admiralty courts applied the law of
finds to sunken ships.55 In order to succeed under the theory of finds
with respect to a shipwreck in maritime law, a litigant must prove that
the property had never been owned and, therefore, belonged to the
finder.56 This is commonly known as "finder's keepers. ' 57 Typical
"finds" include whales or large fish; in this situation the owner not
only keeps the property, but also the proceeds from the property.58
Courts also apply the maritime law of finds to shipwrecks discov-
ered in international waters because this application assures uniform
legal protection to those who search for and find the ships.59 In order
for the law of finds to apply, a salvor, first, must take control of a
wreck and prove that it has been abandoned. 60 Next, a court must
find that the abandoned ship has returned to a natural state as a result
54. The supporters of the ASA did not believe that admiralty's application of the law of sal-
vage adequately protected historic shipwrecks. See generally Abandoned Shipwreck Act of
1987, Pub. L. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 432) 365 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101
et seq.). At the committee hearings, Edward M. Miller, a professional salvor and sport diver,
testified to the importance of professional salvors and their importance in the excavation of
historic shipwrecks. See Oceanography Miscellaneous, Part /: Hearings before the Subcomm. On
Oceanography, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., 99th Cong. 60 (1985) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Edward M. Miller). While running a primarily financial enterprise, sal-
vors may also be of assistance in harvesting these artifacts and eliminating some of the financial
burden on the government. Id. The opponents of the ASA encouraged the Committee to un-
derstand the importance of commercial salvors with regards to historic shipwrecks. See Id.
(statement of Hon. Dante B. Fascell, Rep. Fla.). Representative Fascell urged that the encour-
agement of commercial salvors and the application of the law of salvage would benefit private
enterprise, alleviate financial burdens, and allow for the romance of exploration and discovery
that has motivated many commercial salvors in the past. Id. Instead of deciding between salvors
and archeologists, as the ASA does, both could have been satisfied by merely setting some new
guidelines. Id. However, the writers of the ASA disagreed and the statute specifically states
that the law of salvage and the law of finds do not apply to historic shipwrecks falling under the
ASA. 43 U.S.C. §2106(a). See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
55. See Treasure Salvors Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569
F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978). A finder must first gain control and possess the property before he
receives title to the property. See Hearings, supra note 44, at 34.
56. See Adams v. Unione Mediterrane di Sicresta, 220 F.3d 659, 671 (5th Cir. 2001).
57. 3A BENEDICTF ON ADMIRALTY § 158 (Martin J. Norris et al., eds. 7th rev. ed. 1995), The
law of salvage, right to possession (2000). See also Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L.
100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 432) 365, 366 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.).
58. See NORRIS, supra note 57, at § 160.
59. Drew Horrell, Telepossession is Nine-Tenths of the Law, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 309, 343-347
(1991).
60. See Lorello, supra note 31, at 77.
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of its submersion in the sea or ocean floor.61 Essentially, the ship re-
verts to a "state of nature" and becomes the type of property that has
no owner, such as fish and ocean plants.62
Typically, when a salvor fails to prove abandonment and an owner
exists, the court will then apply the law of salvage, not the law of
finds.63 However, courts have found that the ASA transfers title of
the ship to the state; therefore, the ship has not been abandoned and
the law of finds may apply. 64
c. The Law of Salvage and the Law of Finds After the ASA
In light of maritime law's treatment of abandoned shipwrecks, the
ASA explicitly states that the laws of salvage and finds do not apply to
abandoned shipwrecks. 65 A conflict exists between the ASA's ideals
of preservation, believing a historic shipwreck should remain at the
site where it was found, and a salvor's desire to protect a historic ship-
wreck by retrieving the artifacts and important parts of the ship to
preserve them above ground.66
Federal historic preservation laws, policies, and management pro-
grams evince a strong preference to leave sites undisturbed and pre-
vent the recovery of artifacts. This is in direct contrast with the
general presumption under the maritime law of salvage that historic
shipwrecks are in marine peril and need to be salvaged so that they
can be returned to the stream of commerce. 67
61. Id. at 78.
62. See Hener v. U.S., 525 F. Supp. 350, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
63. Id. at 356.
64. See Seena Foster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Abandoned Ship-
wreck Act of 1987, 163 A.L.R. FED. 421, 428 (2000). In this convoluted reading of the law, the
ASA simply applies traditional admiralty law. Id.
65. Relationship to Other Laws, 43 U.S.C. §2106 (1994).
(a) Law of salvage and law of finds. The law of salvage and the law of finds shall not
apply to abandoned shipwrecks to which section 6 of this Act [43 USCS § 2105] applies.
(b) Laws of United States. This Act [43 USCS §§ 2101 et seq.] shall not change the
laws of the United States relating to shipwrecks, other than those to which this Act [43
USCS §§ 2101 et seq.] applies.
(c) Effective date. This Act [43 USCS §§ 2101 et seq.] shall not affect any legal pro-
ceeding brought prior to the date of enactment of this Act [enacted April 28, 1988].
See also Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987; Preserving Wetlands, Historic, and Prehistoric sites in
the St. John's River Valley, Florida: Hearings before the Subcomm. On Pub. Lands, Nat'l Parks,
and Forests, S. Energy and Nat'l Res. Comm., 100th Cong. 255 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings].
66. Ole Varmer, Non-Salvor Interests: The Case Against the "Salvage" of the Cultural Heritage,
30 J. MAR. L & COM. 279, 279 (1999).
67. Id. at 281.
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These conflicting viewpoints on preservation could have added to the
belief that salvors and admiralty courts only concerned themselves
with the financial rewards of historic shipwrecks. 68
Prior to the ASA, when a salvor claimed title under the laws of
finds or salvage, a state could intervene through a state preservation
statute in order to hinder the salvor; the courts would then weigh the
competing interests of the state and the salvor under maritime law.69
Today, if a state satisfies all the ASA's elements, the title of the wreck
transfers to the state and falls out of the jurisdiction of admiralty
courts.70 However, if the state fails to prove any one element of the
ASA, such as abandonment, admiralty law will control and the salvor
will receive either a salvage reward or title to the vessel. 71
B. Passage of the ASA
Both state and federal courts claimed authority over historic ships
and items salvaged from them prior to the enactment of the ASA. 72
Under the ASA, the United States asserts title to any abandoned ship-
wreck that is "(1) embedded in the submerged lands of a state, (2)
embedded in coralline formations protected by a State on submerged
lands of a State; or (3) on submerged lands of a State and is included
in or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register. ' 73
68. "[The ASA] would be helpful in this regard because it would effectively place historic
shipwrecks outside the jurisdiction of admiralty law, which currently recognizes only the com-
mercial value of abandoned historic shipwrecks." See Hearings, supra note 65, at 255. "Only by
removing abandoned shipwrecks from the jurisdiction of admiralty law can we begin to treat
these important cultural resources with the same care as similar resources on land." Id. at 257.
69. See Lorello, supra note 31, at 8t.
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. See also Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and
Abandoned Vessel Believed to be the "Seabird," 941 F.2d 525, 528-29 (7th Cir. t991) (emphasiz-
ing limited scope of ASA: it eliminated the law of salvage and finds in order to better protect
historic shipwrecks).
71. Zych, 941 F.2d at 528-29. The burden shifts to the state under the ASA to prove abandon-
ment; in contrast to admiralty law in which the salvor proves abandonment. Id.
72. Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 432)
365, 366 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.).
73. Rights of Ownership, 43 U.S.C. §2105 (1994).
(a) United States title. The United States asserts title to any abandoned shipwreck that
is-
(1) embedded in submerged lands of a State;
(2) embedded in coralline formations protected by a State on submerged lands of a
State; or
(3) on submerged lands of a State and is included in or determined eligible for inclusion
in the National Register.
(b) Notice of shipwreck location; eligibility determination for inclusion in National
Register of Historic Places. The public shall be given adequate notice of the location of
any shipwreck to which title is asserted under this section. The Secretary of the Interior,
after consultation with the appropriate State Historic Preservation Officer, shall make
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The Act further provides that "[t]he title of the United States to any
abandoned shipwreck asserted under subsection (a) of this section is
transferred to the State in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck
is located. ' 74 The drafters of the ASA hoped that by transferring title
to the states, the states would assume the role of salvor and recover
the lost treasures, but with an eye toward preservation. 75
Because admiralty law developed largely out of the need to control
commercial ventures, rather than the need to manage cultural re-
sources, Congress expected state courts to recognize the cultural value
of discovered shipwrecks, not merely their commercial value.76 Con-
gress removed historic shipwreck litigation from admiralty's jurisdic-
tion even though shipwrecks remain in the oceans and usually arrived
there as a result of commercial endeavors under the assumption that
the states would care about historical preservation. Preservationists
and archeologists criticized the maritime courts for their concentra-
tion on successful salvage, as opposed to preservation.
[A]s our judge told us .... it is the business of the Federal admiralty
courts to encourage the recovery of material from shipwrecks to be
a written determination that an abandoned shipwreck meets the criteria for eligibility
for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places under clause (a)(3) of this
section.
(c) Transfer of title to States. The title of the United States to any abandoned shipwreck
asserted under subsection (a) of this section is transferred to the State in or on whose
submerged lands the shipwreck is located.
(d) Exception. Any abandoned shipwreck in or on the public lands of the United States
is the property of the United States Government. Any abandoned shipwreck in or on
any Indian lands is the property of the Indian tribe owning such lands.
(e) Reservation of rights. This section does not affect any right reserved by the United
States or by any State (including any right reserved with respect to Indian lands)
under-
(1) section 1311, 1313, or 1314 of this title; or
(2) section 414 or 415 of title 33. Id.
74. Id.
75. Sabrina L.:McLaughlin, Roots, Relics and Recovery: What Went Wrong with the Aban-
doned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARrs 149, 151 (1995). "[T]he purpose of
the ASA was not simply to rearrange substantive remedies but to transfer management of and
litigation over embedded shipwreck sites from the federal courts to the states." Zych 941 F.2d at
531.
76. See generally Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102
Stat. 432) 365, 366-77 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.). See also supra note 23 and
accompanying text. See also Hearings, supra note 65, at 252.
Currently, admiralty law recognizes only the commercial value of abandoned ship-
wrecks. The recognition that abandoned shipwrecks have additional values would be a
first step to developing mechanisms for multiple use of these resources. In addition to
their recognized commercial value, abandoned shipwrecks have recreational, historic,




brought before the court. Our judge specifically told us it was not
the business of the admiralty courts to be concerned about the char-
acter of the salvor or the disposition of the artifacts salved. 77
In the past, shipwrecks and their recovery had been left to the de-
vices of admiralty law because only those individuals familiar with
oceans and salvage efforts attempted to raise or salvage abandoned
ships. However, with the advent of new technologies in the past
twenty to thirty years and an increase in scuba and sport diving, indi-
viduals with no previous interest in the oceans, such as archeologists,
now have the ability to dive to the depths of the oceans to research
the past as preserved on shipwrecks. 78 This new ability to explore the
depths of the oceans led to tension between the traditional application
of admiralty law and the newly enacted ASA.
Congress passed the ASA in the hope of clarifying which courts had
authority over abandoned shipwrecks and, hence, maintained the
right to manage and salvage them.79 The ASA vests title of aban-
doned shipwrecks in the state within whose water the shipwreck
rests. 80 Once the terms of the ASA are satisfied, the United States
asserts title to the shipwreck and then transfers title to the state;81
thus, the federal government loses control over the shipwreck. Oppo-
nents of the ASA argued that the transfer of title to the state contra-
dicts Article III of the Constitution, which gives federal courts
jurisdiction over all admiralty and maritime issues as this power in-
cludes the right to salvage wrecks. 82
The ASA also clarified that shipwrecks in state waters are a public
commodity and must be preserved for the public's use and benefit.83
However, while a state provides the public with access to these ship-
wrecks, it must also protect the natural resources surrounding the
shipwreck, guarantee exploration for sport divers, and permit public
77. Oceanography Misc., Part 2: Hearings before Subcomm. on Oceanography, House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, 97th Cong. 170 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings].
78. Id. at 169. "We have come to regard shipwrecks as archeological sites as significant as
land sites, as significant as the Chaco ruins in New Mexico." Id.
79. However, prior to the ASA, state common law courts could have jurisdiction over mari-
time cases that concerned quantum meruit services or breach of salvage. McLaughlin, supra
note 75, at 160. State courts adequately adjudicated these issues because contract problems are
common law problems, not issues particular to the sea.
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. See also Lorello, supra note 31, at 81.
81. Lorello, supra note 31, at 81.
82. See H.R. REP. No. 100-514(1), at 16 (1988) (dissenting views of Norman D. Shumway et
al.).
83. Rights of Access, 43 U.S.C. §2103 (1994). "(a) Access rights. In order to - (1) clarify that
State waters and shipwrecks offer recreational and educational opportunities to sport divers and
other interested groups, as well as irreplaceable State resources for tourism, biological sanctuar-
ies, and historical research." Id.
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and private recovery of the items on the shipwrecks consistent with
preservation of the site.84
Congress identified and defined the majority of terms contained in
the ASA. 85 However, the ASA failed to define the essential, and
most litigated, term: abandonment. 86 At the time of the ASA's enact-
ment, the Committee determined that abandonment "does not re-
quire the original owner to actively disclaim title or ownership. The
abandonment or relinquishment of ownership rights may be implied
or otherwise inferred, as by an owner never asserting any control over
or otherwise indicating his claim of possession in a shipwreck. ' 87 The
Committee created one explicit exception to this interpretation of
abandonment: United States warships.88 The United States only
abandons its title to sunken warships through an affirmative act;89
thus, neither passage of time nor the failure to positively assert the
right establishes abandonment in the isolated instance of sunken
United States warships. 90
C. The Goal of Preservation
"Cultural property is that specific form of property that enhances
identity, understanding, and appreciation for the culture that pro-
84. Id.
It is the declared policy of the Congress that States carry out their responsibilities under
this Chapter to develop appropriate and consistent policies so as to - (A) protect natu-
ral resources and habitat areas; (B) guarantee recreational exploration of shipwreck
sites; and (C) allow for appropriate public and private sector recovery of shipwrecks
consistent with the protection of historical values and environmental integrity of the
shipwrecks and the sites.
Id. In order to assist states with preserving the abandoned shipwrecks, funds are available
through the Historic Preservation Fund to create underwater parks that would provide addi-
tional protections for resources.
(b) Parks and protected areas. In managing the resources subject to the provisions of
this Chapter, States are encouraged to create underwater parks or areas that provide
additional protection for such resources. Funds available to states from grants from the
Historic Preservation Fund shall be available, in accordance with provisions of title 1 of
the National Historic preservation Act, for the study, interpretation, protection, and
preservation of historic shipwrecks and properties.
Id.
85. See Definitions, 43 U.S.C. §2102 (1994). Essential terms such as embedded, submerged
lands, State, National Register, public lands, and shipwreck are all defined. Id.
86. Id. No definition for abandonment exists in the definition section of the ASA.
87. Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 432)
365, 366 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.).
88. Id. at 367-68.
89. Id. at 367.
90. Id. at 368
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duced the particular property." 9' The United States has often been
accused of having a "short cultural memory"; 92 however, an increase
in legislation intended to protect cultural property began to remedy
this situation.93 In addition, the United States Supreme Court rein-
forced and promoted the purpose of preservation when it found that
historical preservation legislation is important because it promotes the
general welfare. 94
Over the past 50 years, all 50 States and over 500 municipalities
have enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of
buildings and areas with historic or aesthetic importance. These na-
tionwide legislative efforts have been precipitated by two concerns.
The first is recognition that, in recent years, large numbers of his-
toric structures, landmarks, and areas have been destroyed without
adequate consideration of either the values represented therein or
the possibility of preserving the destroyed properties for use in eco-
nomically productive ways. The second is a widely shared belief
that structures with special historic, cultural, or architectural signifi-
cance enhance the quality of life for all. Not only do these buildings
and their workmanship represent the lessons of the past and em-
body precious features of our heritage, they serve as examples of
quality for today. "[H]istoric conservation is but one aspect of the
much larger problem, basically an environmental one, of enhancing
-or perhaps developing for the first time -the quality of life for
people."95
Underwater sites are unique because, unlike land sites, they have
not been touched or disturbed by man; underwater sites remain com-
pletely protected, resulting in "untouched storehouses of historical
data. ' 96 Immediately after a ship sinks, it begins to adapt to its new
underwater environment, and eventually it becomes a part of the
91. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in
the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569 (1995).
92. Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEw ENG. L.
Ri-v. 63, 64 (1993).
93. See generally Id. at 64 for a synopsis of American cultural preservation laws.
94. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1985) (holding that New
York's landmark preservation laws do not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking because they
promote the general welfare).
95. Id. at 107-08.
96. See Hearings, supra note 54, at 76.
Land sites have usually been subject to generations of human use and intervention. As
a result, the site is more of a mix of time capsules from different periods. In contrast,
the historic shipwreck site is more likely to be a single period time capsule. Not only is
an underwater historic shipwreck site a more pristine time capsule of the period, it
often can help explain the mix of time capsules contained on a terrestrial site.
Varmer, supra note 66, 288.
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marine environment.97 A thin coating of "snow" grows over the
wreck from perishing marine organisms. 98 The amount of deteriora-
tion of a ship depends on several factors, such as the amount of oxy-
gen in the iwater, different chemicals that may exist in the water, and
the ship's actual composition; however, once the seabed covers a ship-
wreck, deterioration greatly slows as a result of the lack of oxygen. 99
The seabed acts as a preserver and maintains the ship in the same
condition as when it sank. 100 Once excavation begins or the shipwreck
is disturbed, oxygen begins to seep into the ship and preservation be-
comes threatened.' 0 '
Historic shipwrecks provide key insight to our cultural history be-
cause a facet of life from a former time period has been completely
preserved while submerged below the sea.10 2 These perfectly pre-
served artifacts, discovered on historic shipwrecks, are essential to un-
derstanding the life and history of the United States. 10 3 Excavation
destroys a ship and the cultural history it possesses. 10 4
Excavation, even careful excavation, is a destructive activity that
changes a site forever and destroys the potential for future data col-
lection. That is why the decision to excavate is not made lightly; the
disturbance of a site should be abandoned if it cannot be done prop-
erly, or delayed if there is a chance that in the future we can ap-
proach it with improved methods or equipment. 05
97. Id. at 280. For example, in 1993, Deep Sea Research located the Brother Jonathan four
and half miles off the coast of Crescent City, California in 250 feet of water, with its hull, floor,
galley, and cabins largely intact. Deep Sea Research v. The Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343,
1347 (1995). The wreck remained so well preserved in its resting spot on the ocean floor that
even the smallest bit of cargo, such as dishes, can be plainly seen sitting on the ocean floor. Id.
In addition, Deep Sea Research found other well-preserved artifacts, such as china, a corked full
champagne bottle, a medicine bottle, an ale bottle, and a brass spike from the ship's hull. Id.
98. Robert D. Ballard, How We Found the Titanic, 168 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 695, 696 (1985).
99. Varmer, supra note 66, at 280.
100. Id. at 280-81.
101. Id. at 281.
102. Hearings, supra note 65, at 254. The "study of shipwrecks provides an invaluable oppor-
tunity from several disciplinary viewpoints to study the physical remains of man's activities upon
the sea. In many instances, the wrecks are well preserved and relatively undisturbed by man or
the marine environment." Id. However, it is important to remember that not all shipwrecks
maintain this historical importance. Id.
103. See generally Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at 609. Professor Gerstenblith clarifies that
cultural property and art are two distinct ideas: art represents the creative and society gives it a
monetary value; whereas, cultural objects are objects that give insight into a particular commu-
nity and manifest an expression of that community regardless of its monetary value or creative
aspects. Id. at 569.
104. D.K. Abbass, A Marine Archeologist Looks at Treasure Salvage, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM.
261, 261 (1999); Varmer, supra note 66, at 280-81.
105. Abbass, supra note 104, at 262.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:569
Archeologists prefer to study recovered artifacts in the environment
they are found because removing the artifacts from their resting
places result in a large loss of information about the culture. 0 6 The
environment provides clues as to how the ship sank and how the crew
and passengers lived. 0 7 For example, when the Titanic was discov-
ered, the placement of the lookout post and the number and precise
location of binoculars in the steering room aided the archaeologists in
building the story of how the Titanic actually sank. 10 8
Exploration by salvors and divers often resulted in the destruction
of the seabed and the historic shipwreck because disassembling the
wreck disturbed the preservation process. 09 Explorers sometimes
used explosives and propeller-wash deflectors that destroyed the sea-
bed and the ship without prior research and exploration into the site
of the shipwreck or the surrounding areas, which may also have con-
tained important cultural information.'t 0 "This approach is more akin
to strip mining than it is to archaeological research and [it] has de-
stroyed countless natural and cultural resources, in addition to the
contextual information contained in these time capsules.'11
Prior to the ASA, the legislature enacted several other programs
aimed at restoring historic landmarks and artifacts." 2 However, as a
result of improvements in technology, previously enacted laws failed
to protect the special needs of historic ships against sport divers and
106. Varmer, supra note 66, at 287. Varmer illustrates the importance of leaving the preserva-
tion area untouched through the pyramids in Egypt. Id. When archaeologists retrieved artifacts
from the Egyptian pyramids, they took them out of the pyramids and doled them out to muse-
ums across the world. Id. "[l1t would have been much better for science and the Egyptian
culture to have left the artifacts where they were discovered. It clearly would be preferable to be
able to study the objects where they [were] found. Their removal undoubtedly resulted in the
loss of much information about this culture." Id.
107. Varmer, supra note 66, at 290.
108. Id. See infra notes 291 and 295 and accompanying text.
109. See generally Varmer, supra note 66, at 281.
110. Id., at 295-96. Many concerns exist over the destruction of natural resources, as well as
shipwrecks, in the excavation process. For example, in "mailboxing," a salvage vessel's propel-
lers are pointed downward into the seabed where they push through layers of sand and seabed to
find artifacts and treasures. McLaughlin, supra note 75, at 181. A debate continues as to
whether practices such as mailboxing are any more damaging to the sea environment than sport
diving or a strong storm; however, this argument underscores the importance of protecting cul-
tural resources as well as the ships. Id.
111. Varmer, supra note 66, at 295.
112. Federal agencies have protected historic properties, including shipwrecks, located on
public lands beginning with the Antiquities Act in 1906 (16 U.S.C. 431-433), affirmation of this
goal in 1979 with the enactment of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (16 U.S.C.
470aa-mm), and expansion of the National Historic Preservation Act in 1980 (16 U.S.C. 470 et
seq.). See generally, Phelan, supra note 92, at 63 (listing preservation laws, protections, and
impact).
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salvors. 113 Congress expected the enactment of the ASA to remedy
this gap in protection.11 4 In reaction to the ASA, all states now in-
clude underwater resources in their state historic plans.115 Presently
there are 579 sites listed as underwater parks in comparison to the
thirty-six listed sites in 1988, and many states have created underwater
parks.116
While the ASA is an important step to recognizing the importance
of valuable underwater resources, critics believe that it fails miserably
in its application and goals.117 In Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked,
Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the Lady Elgin and the Seabird,118
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit deter-
mined whether the Lady Elgin fell under the terms of the ASA. The
ship's recovery received extensive media attention, which alerted
other divers and salvors to its location." 9 Because title to the ship
remained undetermined, no one could act to preserve the artifacts,
leaving them vulnerable to the means and devices of less ethical and
less careful divers.' 20 "Unhappily, the broad statutory language of
'abandoned' and 'embedded' does not resolve these controversies; in-
113. Timothy T. Stevens, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Finding the Proper Balast
For the States, 37 VILL. L. REV. 573, 575-78 (1992).
114. Id.
115. Anne G. Giesecke, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act Through the Eyes of its Drafter, 30 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 167, 168 (1999).
116. See Id. Giesecke lists five specific improvements resulting from the ASA: (1) in 1988,
only twenty-seven states had laws specifically addressing underwater resources, now all the
states have re-evaluated their underwater resources management, (2) all states now include un-
derwater resources in their historic preservation management plans, (3) in 1988, only thirty-six
underwater resources were listed in the National Register of Historic Preservation, today 579
sites are listed, (4) in 1988 only Florida had an underwater park, and "dozens of states now have
dozens of parks," and (5) as opposed to facing forty or fifty salvor claims a year, for the last
seven years, courts have been dealing with the same four vessels. Id.
117. See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
118. 941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991).
119. Paul N. Keller, Salvor-Sovereign Relations: How the State of Illinois Destroyed the Lady
Elgin, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 245, 246-47 (1999).
120. Id. For example, while still deep in litigation, Paul Keller and Zych requested a meeting
with Illinois State officials to discuss ways of preserving the artifacts after the onslaught of media
attention. Id. at 246. The State of Illinois refused to enter into any agreement unless Zych
conceded that the Lady Elgin was property of Illinois. Id. at 247. In September 1992, after the
case went back to the district court on remand, another diver discovered the wreck and sold the
information to the State of Illinois. Id. Fortunately, while the district court still could not deter-
mine who possessed title to the Lady Elgin, the district court judge issued an injunction prohibit-
ing any other entity from claiming ownership. Id. at 248. Next, the State of Illinois sent a letter
to the Underwater Archeological Society of Illinois (UASC) that authorized it to act as an agent
of Illinois. Id.
Now designated 'agents of the State,' the leaders of the UASC appointed themselves
the Lady Elgin research team .... They began diving the wreck site and continued for
the next two years, at first daily, then weekly, and finally periodically .... Within a few
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stead, disputes have arisen concerning the definitions and the stan-
dard of proof to resolve recurring problems that have been removed
from experienced admiralty courts and transferred to state adminis-
trative agencies. ' '121
In addition, because the ASA failed to adequately define a "his-
toric" shipwreck, it covers most shipwreck artifacts regardless of the
age of the shipwreck or the historical or cultural value that the ship-
wreck may have. 122 Because of their great historical value and the
number of years that have passed since their sailing, the historical
value of Greek and Roman shipwrecks is evidentt 23 The "quintessen-
tial" example of a historic shipwreck would be a vessel that is several
hundred years old and connected to Christopher Columbus' voy-
ages.124 However, merely basing historical value on age may be im-
months, all of the smaller and most valuable artifacts had disappeared from the site. In
short, the [State of Illinois], through the UASC, wrecked the Lady Elgin.
Id. at 249. The misfortunes of the Lady Elgin illustrate the problems resulting from lack of
federal or state regulation in historic shipwreck preservation under the ASA.
121. Joseph C. Sweeney, An Overview of Commercial Salvage Principles in the Context of
Marine Archaeology, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 185, 197 (1999). Richard Tobol, general counsel for
the Columbus-America Group noted that, "Sadly, the judicial system appears incapable of
resolving even the simplest underwater cultural resource questions in a timely or efficient mat-
ter. The issue of 'abandonment' is illustrative." Richard T. Robol, Legal Protection for Under-
water Cultural Resources: Can We Do Better?, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 303, 308 (1999). The very
problems the ASA intended to solve, increased litigation and lack of uniformity, actually have
become more frequent as result of the unclear statutory language.
122. McLaughlin, supra note 75, at 154. The Committee estimated that of the approximately
50,000 shipwrecks existing, only five to ten percent actually possessed historical significance. See
Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 432) 365
(to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.). See also Rights of Ownership to Abandoned Ship-
wrecks, 43 U.S.C. §2105 (1994); supra note 73 and accompanying text. The National Register
means the Secretary of the Interior's National Register of Historic Places under 16 U.S.C. § 470
(2000). See 36 C.F.R. 18.2(h). In determining a need for the National Historic Preservation Act,
Congress found:
(1) the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in historical
heritage; (2) the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved
as a living part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of
orientation to the American people; (3) historic properties significant to the Nation's
heritage are being lost or substantially altered, often inadvertently, with increasing fre-
quency ....
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §470 (2000). Cf. Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v.
The Shipwrecked Vessels Known as the Captain Lawrence, 913 F. Supp. 552, 556 (N.D. Mich.
1995) (stating that Michigan had found that none of the artifacts from Captain Lawrence were
historically significant, unique, or a good specimen; therefore, they failed to satisfy the prerequi-
site for historic preservation).
123. GEOFFREY BRICE, MARITIME LAW OF SALVAGE 259 (3rd ed. 1999).
124. Foster, supra note 64, at 443. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois in the Zych case reasoned that Congress understood the ASA could potentially cover
more than just historic shipwrecks. Zych v. Unidentified Wrecked, and Abandoned Vessel, Be-
lieved to be the S.S. Seabird, 881 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (N.D. II. 1992). The court rationalized
Congress' failure to define "historic" by concluding that the "embeddedness" requirement must
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practicable because some ships could acquire historic interest at an
early stage while some "old" ships may not necessarily possess any
historical value. 12 5 Mired in its basic purpose of historic preservation,
the ASA was just beginning to encounter the problem of emerging
technologies.
D. Litigation Under the ASA
Since its enactment, very few cases have been litigated under the
ASA. The initial cases interpreting the ASA discussed its constitu-
tionality and the effect of the Eleventh Amendment on the Act. Cur-
rently, a split exists among the Appellate Circuits over the definition
of abandonment, specifically whether it is implied or express.
Four cases comprise the heart of the ASA. In the first to reach an
appellate court, Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Vessel
believed to be the Seabird,126 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the ASA and
the term "embedded. ' 127 In a second case, California & State Lands
Commission v. Deep Sea Research, 28 the United States Supreme
Court declared the constitutionality of the ASA and attempted to
clarify the definition of abandonment. 2 9 The last two cases created a
be rationally related to the protection of shipwrecks. Id. Relying on the legislative hearing of
the Act, which indicated it was mainly for the preservation of historic ships, the court reasoned
that embedded related to historic because the U.S. asserts title to ships that are (1) embedded in
submerged lands, (2) embedded in coralline formations, or (3) on submerged lands and included
in the National Register. Id. See Rights of Ownership, 43 U.S.C. §2105 (1994); supra note 73
and accompanying text. However, the Abandoned Shipwreck Advisory Guidelines states that
"The commentators recommended that 'historic' shipwrecks be defined according to their histor-
ical qualities only, without regard to whether they are embedded. The definition has been re-
vised accordingly." Abandoned Shipwreck Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 50117 (1990). Moreover,
common sense indicates that any ship that sank and remained in the ocean for a number of years
would also be embedded and submerged; thereby conferring historical stature on every sub-
merged or embedded shipwreck. This court's interpretation further illustrates the confusion sur-
rounding the ASA and its application despite Congress' intent to simplify the law surrounding
abandoned shipwrecks.
125. BRICE, supra note 123, at 259. A moral question may also exist as to what ships should
be historically important. For example, a Nazi submarine has an important historical placement
in World War II; but does such a ship possess the cultural artifacts that the ASA was designed to
protect? Many critics also raise moral questions regarding abandoned shipwrecks. For example
the Juno contained gold and silver stolen from indigenous peoples of Central and South
America; moreover, these people were also slaves to the Spanish. William J. Broad, Court Rul-
ing on Spanish Frigates Foils Modern-Day Treasure Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2000, at Al. "If
Spain recovers its lost booty ... it will raise questions of whether it should pay compensation,
just as Germany has agreed to make financial amends to victims of the Nazis." Id. at All.
126. 941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991).
127. Id.
128. 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
129. Id.
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split at the appellate level. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit determined that abandonment could be inferred
from the evidence in Fairport International Exploration v. The Ship-
wrecked Vessel Known as Captain Lawrence.130 In contrast, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that ex-
press abandonment applies under the ASA, particularly when the ship
belonged to a sovereign in Sea Hunt v. the Unidentified Shipwrecked
Vessels or Vessel.131
1. The Constitutionality of the ASA and Abandonment
The first appellate court to apply the ASA to an abandoned ship,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, followed
maritime law's definition of abandonment when it found that aban-
donment occurs "by an express or implied act of leaving or deserting
property without the hope of recovering it and without the intention
of returning to it.'132 Harry Zych, who owned a commercial salvaging
business, found the Seabird off the shore of Waukegan, Illinois in 1989
after hours of library research and ten days of diving.133 He then filed
an in rem action seeking title to the ship under either the law of finds
or the law of salvage. 134
The Seabird litigation was primarily concerned with the term "em-
bedded" 135 from the ASA and was remanded to determine whether
130. 105 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1997).
131. 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000) cert. denied, Virginia v. Spain, 531 U.S. 1144 (2001), and cert.
denied Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Spain, 531 U.S. 1144 (2001).
132. Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, believed to be the "Seabird," 941
F.2d 525, 527 (7th Cir. 1991). Although the court's dicta discussed the definition of "abandon-
ment," the actual issue in this case was "embeddedness." Id. at 529-30.
133. Id. at 526-27.
134. Id. at 527. Initially, Zych's claim involved two ships: the Seabird and the Lady Elgin.
Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked, Abandoned Vessel, 746 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-37 (N.D. I11. 1990).
The Lady Elgin carried mail, freight, and passengers on Lake Michigan and Lake Superior. Id.
at 1336. It sank on September 8, 1860 while returning from a Democratic Party rally in Chicago
for presidential candidate Stephen Douglas. Some have attributed the change of political power
in Milwaukee from Irish to German to the sinking of the Lady Elgin because a great majority of
the three hundred passengers that perished were Irish political activists. Id. The Seabird, a 638
ton sidewheel steamer, sank in Lake Michigan on April 9, 1868 taking with it ninety-eight of the
one hundred passengers. Zych, 746 F. Supp. at 1137. The large stove kept going all night to
warm the passengers on that particularly cold night. Id. However, while cleaning the stove the
next morning, the porter threw the hot ashes into the wind; caught in the wind, the ashes flew
back into the cargo on the ship. Id. Several highly varnished tubs were swiftly ignited and the
fire quickly spread through the cabin as a result of newly painted woodwork. Id.
135. "[Tjhe term 'embedded' means firmly affixed in the submerged lands or in coralline for-
mations such that the use of tools of excavation is required in order to move the bottom sedi-
ments to gain access to the shipwreck, its cargo, and any party thereof." Definitions, 43 U.S.C.
§2102(a) (2000). See generally Christopher Meazell, Note, Being and Embeddedness: The Aban-
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the ship was in fact embedded. 136 The Seventh Circuit addressed
Zych's uniformity concern by relying on the ASA's preservation
goals. The court found that the preservation of abandoned ship-
wrecks is a central concern in admiralty law; hence, state management
of shipwrecks that satisfy the ASA cannot violate the uniformity
principle. 137
2. The Supreme Court Fails to Define Abandonment
The United States Supreme Court has reviewed only one case inter-
preting the ASA, California & State Lands Commission v. Deep Sea
Research, which raised issues of abandonment and the Eleventh
Amendment.138 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits a citizen from
bringing an action against his state in federal court.139 In an attempt
to circumvent federal courts, states asserted that actions against a ship
embedded in state lands actually constituted an action against the
state because the ship became part of the state lands.140 The Supreme
Court found the Eleventh Amendment to be inapplicable to aban-
doned shipwrecks because it does not bar federal jurisdiction over
vessels; therefore, federal courts may adjudicate the claims to a ship-
wreck under the ASA. 141
The Brother Jonathon sank when it hit a submerged rock in 1865,
off the coast of Northern California, taking with it the lives of ninety-
three passengers, cargo, and valuables, including gold. 142 Shortly after
the sinking, five insurance companies paid claims totaling $48,490 for
the loss of the ship; however, two-thirds of the cargo was uninsured. 143
In October 1993, Deep Sea Research located the wreck four and a
half miles off the coast of Crescent City, California in 250 feet of
doned Shipwreck Act's Historical Proxy is All at Sea, 34 GA. L. REV. 1743 (2000) (discussing
various circuits' application of "embedded" under the ASA).
136. Zych, 941 F.2d at 534.
137. Id. Note, however, that the justification for removing abandoned shipwrecks from admi-
ralty law's jurisdiction was to promote preservation, a goal the Congress believed the admiralty
courts could not fill. See supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
138. California & State Lands Commission v. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
139. U.S. CoNsT. Amend. XI. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commence or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
140. See Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
141. California and State Lands Comm'n. v. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1998).
142. Deep Sea Research, 883 F. Supp. at 1347.
143. Id. It is estimated that the ship's cargo also included $2 million in gold and the United
States Army payroll of $250,000. Carl Nolte, 1865 Shipwreck Discovered Off the North Coast
Legend Says Steamer Sank with Gold, Booze, Camels, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Feb. 25,
1994, p. 1.
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water with the Brother Jonathon's hull, floor, galley, and cabins largely
intact.144 The United States District Court for the Northern District
of California found that an abandoned shipwreck was "any shipwreck
to which title voluntarily has been given up by the owner with the
intent of never claiming a right or interest in the future and without
vesting ownership in any other person. ' 145 In order to prove aban-
donment under the district court's standard of clear and convincing
evidence, the state must show (1) the original owner's intent to aban-
don and (2) physical acts carrying out that intent. 146
California argued that the Brother Jonathan's owners abandoned it
because they had not attempted to salvage the vessel since 1865.147
However, California only offered the testimony of one historian who
erroneously stated the facts and primarily based his research on three
newspaper articles. 148 Deep Sea Research argued that the ship had
not been abandoned because no affirmative act of abandonment ex-
isted, the technology did not exist to discover the ship until recently,
and insurance claims had been paid on the vessel in 1865.149 As a
result, the underwriters actually possessed title to the Brother
Jonathon.'50
When the Deep Sea Research case reached the United States Su-
preme Court, it primarily addressed the Eleventh Amendment is-
sue.1 51 With respect to the issue of abandonment, the Court
postulated that the lower court's determination that the ship had not
144. Deep Sea Research, 883 F. Supp. at 1347.
145. Id. at 1351 (quoting 55 Fed. Reg 50116, 50120 (Dec. 4, 1990)). In addition, ships for
which insurance claims had been paid were excluded from the definition of abandonment be-
cause the owner received full value for the ship. Id. Hence, title to the shipwreck remains with
the insurance company that paid the owner. Id.
146. Id. at 1351.
147. Id.
148. Id. 1351-52. Rand Frank Herbert, the historian, testified inaccurately to the number of
passengers and cargo the ship carried and the number of victims that actually perished. Deep
Sea Research, 883 F. Supp. at 1351. While he did not find any record of the owner's salvage
attempts, he did find that other divers attempted to salvage the ship; although he could not
determine on which portions of the cargo insurance claims were paid, he did find evidence that
some insurance claims were paid. Id. Although the state had five months to prepare, it hired
Herbert a mere eight days before trial. Id. at 1352. During that period he conducted only
twenty-two hours of research reviewing newspaper articles in the library. Id. Moreover, he did
not research the insurance records nor did he try to contact the underwriters. Id. Most impor-
tant, however, Herbert failed to discover any proof that the owner or the insurance company
publicly disclaimed ownership interest in the Brother Jonathan. Id.
149. Id.
150. Deep Sea Research, 883 F. Supp. at 1351. See infra notes 217-258 and accompanying text
discussing technology and its effect on the definition of abandonment.
151. California and State Lands Comm'n., 523 U.S. at 494. See supra note 139 and accompa-
nying text for Eleventh Amendment explication.
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been abandoned was influenced by their false belief that the Eleventh
Amendment was a central issue.1 52 While the Supreme Court decided
not to make the determination itself, it gave the lower courts guidance
with two illusive sentences: "[W]e decline to resolve whether the
Brother Jonathon is abandoned within the meaning of the ASA. We
leave that issue for reconsideration on remand, with the clarification
that the meaning of 'abandoned' under the ASA conforms with its
meaning under admiralty law."' 153 The problem remains, however,
that courts do not know which admiralty law definition of abandon-
ment to follow: express or implied abandonment.
3. The Sixth Circuit Recognizes Implied Abandonment
In Fairport International Exploration v. The Shipwrecked Vessel
Known as the Captain Lawrence, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that "[c]ommon sense makes readily appar-
ent that the statute did not contemplate a court's requiring express
abandonment; such explicit action is obviously rare indeed, and appli-
cation of such rule would render the ASA a virtual nullity. 1' 54
In 1924, the Boy Scouts of America acquired the Captain Lawrence
to train scouts; it was originally a two-master schooner yacht built in
1898.155 It first sank in 1931 and was later exhumed. 156 While still in
damaged shape, the Boy Scouts sold it to Wilfred Behrens for $150.157
In 1933, the Captain Lawrence sank again near Poverty Island, Michi-
gan while being used to search for a Civil War treasure chest filled
with gold 158 in an amateur diving expedition led by Behrens. 159 A
strong wind caused the wreck, throwing the ship onto the beach and
into rocks. 160 Although Behrens had no insurance, he estimated the
Captain Lawrence's value to be $200,161 which was significant in deter-
mining abandonment because a comparable vessel in the 1930s would
have sold for $14,500.162
152. California and State Lands Comm'n., 523 U.S. at 508.
153. Id.
154. Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. The Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Law-
rence, 105 F.3d 1078, 1085 (6th Cir. 1997).
155. Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. The Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Law-
rence, 913 F. Supp. 552, 555 (N.D. Mich. 1995).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Fairport Int'l Exploration, 105 F.3d at 1080.
159. Fairport Int'l Exploration, 913 F. Supp. at 555.
160. Id. at 555.
161. Id. This estimate was his total loss as he was carrying no cargo. Fairport Int'l Explora-
tion, 105 F.3d at 1080.
162. Fairport Int'l Exploration, 105 F.3d at 1080.
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The group Fairport International Exploration (Fairport) located the
Captain Lawrence believing it might provide the missing link in its
search for the Civil War gold. 163 Since 1978, Libert, the President of
Fairport, had been researching the gold supposedly lost near Poverty
Island during the Civil War.1 64 Many of the stories reference a ship
named St. Lawrence that found the gold in the 1930's, and then sank
off the Coast of Poverty Island. 165 Libert determined that the St. Law-
rence was actually the Captain Lawrence and believed it contained
one chest of gold and logs supplying information regarding the loca-
tion of the remaining treasure.' 66
The district court found that the ASA's definition of abandonment
followed traditional maritime law and relied on two sources for its
determination.1 67 The first was Benedict on Admiralty, which defines
abandonment as "the act of leaving or deserting such property by
those who were in charge of it, without hope on their part of recover-
ing it and without the intention of returning to it."168 The second defi-
nition was derived from the legislative history of the ASA stating that
abandonment "does not require the original owner to actively dis-
claim title or ownership. The abandonment or relinquishment of own-
ership rights may be implied or otherwise inferred, as by an owner
never asserting any control over or otherwise indicating a claim of
possession of the shipwreck."' 69
The court found that although abandonment cannot be inferred
merely by the passage of time or by lack of technology to adequately
salvage the wreck, it often must be inferred based on the surrounding
circumstantial evidence. 170 The court held that Behrens clearly in-
tended to abandon the vessel for several reasons: the wreck was re-
cent, it sank in shallow water, pieces of the ship were found only forty
to sixty feet from the coast, it was technically feasible to locate and
salvage the wreck, Behrens valued the vessel at only $200, he had no
insurance on it, and he declared it a total loss. 171 Moreover, Behrens,
163. Id.
164. Fairport Int'l Exploration, 913 F. Supp. at 555-56.
165. Id. at 556.
166. Id. Once Libert discovered the two ships were one in the same, he contacted Behrens'
daughters. Id. They tried to assist Libert in the search, but because their father always remained
secretive as to what he did, they were unable to provide any helpful information. Id.
167. Id. at 357-58.
168. 913 F. Supp. at 557 (quoting 3A BENEDIC[ ON ADMIRALTY § 134 (Martin J. Norris et al.,
eds.) (7th rev. ed. 1995).
169. Id. quoting the House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
H.R. Rep. No. 100-514(l), 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 365, 366 (1994).
170. Fairport Int'l Exploration, 913 F. Supp. at 558.
171. Id. at 558-59.
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an accomplished salvor who continued to salvage for the remainder of
his life, never attempted to salvage his own ship nor did he tell his
family the ship's location. In addition, his heirs did not attempt to
locate the ship. 172 Hence, the district court found that the state met its
burden of proof by showing that Behrens abandoned the Captain
Lawrence by a preponderance of the evidence. 173
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit cited the
district court's findings and affirmed its holding of abandonment,
when it stated that "[t]he evidence, although circumstantial, clearly
demonstrates Wilfred Behrens' intent to abandon the vessel."'1 74 The
Sixth Circuit relied on the district court's determination in Deep Sea
Research that abandonment occurs either (1) when the title is affirma-
tively renounced or (2) abandonment is inferred as a result of lapse of
time or the owner's failure to pursue salvage attempts.1 75 The Sixth
Circuit held that "there is ample authority that abandonment may, for
some purposes at least, be inferred from the surrounding circum-
stances. And here, there is no question that the district court's finding
of abandonment was not clearly erroneous, as there was an abundance
of circumstantial evidence justifying an inference of abandonment." 176
4. The Fourth Circuit and Express Abandonment
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in con-
trast to the Sixth Circuit, held in Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified
Shipwreck Vessel that the ASA required express abandonment:
"Under admiralty law, where an owner comes forward to assert own-
ership in a shipwreck, abandonment must be shown by express
172. Id.
173. Id. at 559.
174. Fairport Int'l Exploration, 105 F.3d at 1081.
175. Id. at 1084. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the opposing view from Columbus-America,
but noted that it was not an ASA case; the Columbus-America Court applied the law of salvage
and the law of finds, not the ASA. Id. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit rendered its final decision in 1992, five years after the enactment of the ASA, the
litigation commenced in 1987, just prior to the enactment of the ASA. See Columbus-America
Discovery Group v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 974 F.2d 450 (4th
Cir. 1992); Columbus-America Discovery Group v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 668 (E.D. Va. 1988). Applying the law of finds, the Co-
lumbus-America court found that abandonment was a voluntary act that must be proved by a
clear and unmistakable affirmative act indicating a purpose and intent to abandon, such as the
owner's express declaration of abandonment. Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 461. However,
the court in Fairport Int'l Exploration distinguished treasure salvage by noting that "[i]n treasure
salvage cases, often involving wrecks hundreds of years old, the inference of abandonment may
arise from lapse of time and nonuse of the property, or there may even be an express disclaimer
of ownership." Id. citing Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 462 (citation omitted).
176. 105 F.3d at 1085.
2001]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:569
acts."'1 77 Sea Hunt, a maritime salvage company, obtained permits
from the Virginia Marine Resources Commission after locating La
Galga to salvage it and recover historic artifacts.' 78
La Galga, a Spanish frigate carrying slaves and gold, sank when it
ran into a hurricane near Bermuda in 1750.179 After its crew bailed
water for seven days and threw cannons overboard to lighten the ship,
La Galga sank near the present day borders of Maryland and Vir-
ginia. 180 The captain tried to salvage the ship, but he was unsuccessful
because the local residents had already pillaged and looted most of
the wreck.181 Before the captain could begin salvage attempts again,
another storm arose and destroyed the remains of the ship and with it,
the captain's hope of salvage. 182
La Galga remained trapped at the bottom of the sea until Sea
Hunt's recent discovery and salvage of the ship.t:"' , Sea Hunt com-
menced an action by filing an in rem admiralty action against the two
wrecks, 84 claiming that under the ASA, Virginia t85 was the rightful
owner of the wrecks and, therefore, Sea Hunt was entitled to the
rights granted in the permits issued by Virginia Marine Resources
Commission as Spain no longer exercised sovereign immunity over
177. Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwreck Vessel, 221 F.3d 634, 64 (4th Cir. 2000).
The court cites the Columbus-America case summarizing it to say, "[a]n inference of abandon-
ment is permitted, but only when no owner appears." Id.
178. Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwreck Vessel, 47 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (1999).
179. Id. at 680-81. Spain lost a large number of ships because it started conquering other
distant nations very early; from 1580 to 1640, it ruled Portugal, parts of Africa and Asia, and had
acquired lands in the Americas and the Philippines. Broad, supra note 125, at Al.




184. Sea Hunt located two ships, La Galga and Juno, a Spanish naval ship traveling similar
routes to La Galga. Id. at 681. The district court found that no evidence existed in the treaty of
1819 or the 1898 Declaration of War. Id. at 691. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's
holding. Sea Hunt Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwreck Vessel, 221 F.3d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 2000).
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that Spain did not expressly abandon
Juno because Article II of the 1819 Treaty ceded only the territory and the Structures erected on
the Territory. Id.
185. The litigation commenced by Sea Hunt with the State of Virginia eventually also in-
volved "Attorney General Janet Reno, two U.S. Senators, the U.S. Park Service, the government
of Spain and enough lawyers to field a baseball team." Brian Duffy, Treasure Hunting is No Job
For a Guy Out to Avoid Stress, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1998, at Al. Ironically, Mr. Benson, the
head of Sea Hunt and a former navy submariner who was also a millionaire real-estate investor
and owned his own timber company, retired at thirty-six because he had had two heart attacks
related to stress. Id. He bought a yacht and all the newest technological advances in underwater
research, such as sonar equipment, and intended to relax, dive, and search for treasures in the
Caribbean. Id.
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the ships.186 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia held that the Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Brit-
ain, and Spain,187 constituted strong and convincing evidence of ex-
press abandonment because its sweeping language188 and the change
in powers in North American colonies would have made it unlikely
that Spain intended to or would have been allowed to continue to
possess La Galga.'89 Moreover, Spain knew the location of the ship at
the time of salvage and made no attempt to retrieve any of its remains
even though the Treaty would have permitted it.190
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's finding of express abandonment be-
cause "[t]o adopt a lesser standard would .. .go beyond what the
ASA requires." 191 The Fourth Circuit found that whenever an owner
came before the court to assert his claim to title, abandonment would
be hard to show; therefore, as long as the owner made a claim, express
abandonment must be proven.' 92
Further, although the legislative history states that abandonment
may be implied, it may be implied "as by an owner never asserting
any control over or otherwise indicating his claim of possession."
An owner who comes forward has definitely indicated his claim of
possession, and in such a case abandonment cannot be implied.1 93
The Fourth Circuit also emphasized that sovereign vessels were to
be treated differently than privately-owned vessels. 194 A House Re-
port indicated that the United States could only abandon its title to a
186. Sea Hunt Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
187. The 1763 Treaty ended the Seven Years War and transferred several of Spain's territories
in present America to Great Britain in return for Cuba. Sea Hunt Inc., 47 F. Supp. at 689. In
Article XX, Spain granted the territory and Sea Hunt claimed that this grant of land was an
express abandonment of La Galga. Id.
188. Spain ceded its rights to everything owned in North America east of the Mississippi,
including its rights to sunken vessels. Id. at 689.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Sea Hunt, Inc., 221 F.3d at 640. The court of appeals may have considered a stricter
standard for international policy reasons, rather than the ASA's purpose when it continued, "[a
lesser standard] would also abrogate America's obligations to Spain under the 1902 Treaty of
Friendship and General Relations." Id. In contrast to the lower court, the court of appeals
concentrated on who was claiming ownership. "Nothing in the Act indicates, however, that im-
plied abandonment should be the standard in a case such as this where a sovereign asserts own-
ership to its vessels." Id.
192. Id. at 640-41. Essentially, a mere assertion of title eradicates any hopes of implied aban-
donment. Accordingly, under this standard, express abandonment could never be proven be-
cause the owner will always come forward and claim title if he can.
193. Id. at 641 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-514 (1), at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N.
365, 366).
194. Id. David Bederman, a law professor at Emory University who assisted in Sea Hunt's
representation, argued that the meaning of the terms sovereign and private changed greatly in
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sunken warship by an affirmative act; neither passage of time nor fail-
ing to positively assert the right would constitute abandonment.1 95
The Fourth Circuit believed that the House Report accorded the same
protection to other state vessels: "[T]he same presumption against
abandonment will be accorded vessels within the U.S. territorial sea
that, at the time of their sinking, were on the non-commercial service
of another State."'1 96 Finally, the court found that Article X of the
1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations 197 between the
United States and Spain explicitly required express abandonment be-
cause it required that Spanish ships receive the same rights as similarly
situated American vessels.' 98
The Columbus-America Court, which found express abandonment,
and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Deep Sea Re-
search, holding that the ASA does not alter traditional maritime law,
influenced the Fourth Circuit's decision. 99 "According to the Su-
preme Court, 'the meaning of abandoned under the ASA conforms
five hundred years and that private ships are much more common in modern times. Broad,
supra note 125 at Al.
195. Sea Hunt Inc., 221 F.3d at 642 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-514(11) at 13 (1988), reprinted in
1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 381).
196. Id. at 641.
197. Id. The court stated that,
Article X provides "In cases of shipwreck, damages at sea, or forced putting in, each
party shall afford to the vessels of the other ... the same immunities which would have
been granted to its own vessels in similar cases." Treaty of Friendship and General
Relations, July 3, 1902, U.S.-Spain, 33 Stat. 2105. According to the United States De-
partment of State, "this provision is unique" in that no other "friendship, commerce
and navigation treaty of the United States contains such a broadly worded provision
applying to State ships entitled to sovereign immunity." Statement of Interest, U.S.
Dep't of State, P 13 (Dec. 18, 1998).
Id. at 642.
198. Id. See Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102
Stat. 432) 365, 365 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.). Article IV of the Constitution
permits Congress to create rules regarding federal property; therefore, the Court reasoned that
federal property can only be abandoned by an affirmative congressional act. Sea Hunt Inc., 221
F.3d at 642. Because an American vessel could not be abandoned by a clear, affirmative act,
Spanish war vessels could only be abandoned by an express renunciation. Id. at 643. "We can-
not therefore adopt an implied abandonment standard in the face of treaties and mutual under-
standings requiring express abandonment. Such a standard would supplant the textual
framework of negotiated treaties with an unpredictable judicial exercise in weighing equities."
Id. The court also cited advisory guidelines from the Department of the Interior on the ASA,
which stated that when a sovereign vessel appears to be abandoned it "remains the property of
the nation to which it belonged at the time of sinking unless that nation has taken formal action
to abandon it or to transfer title to another party." Id. (quoting 55 Fed. Reg. 50116, 50121
(1990)). The court also strongly considered a letter from the Department of State noting, "U.S.
Domestic law is consistent with the customary international law rule that title to sunken war-
ships may be abandoned only by an express act of abandonment." Id. (quoting Statement of
Interest, U.S. Dep't of State, P. 15).
199. Sea Hunt, Inc., 221 F.3d at 641.
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with its meaning under admiralty law .... Under admiralty law [ac-
cording to Columbus-America], where an owner comes forward to as-
sert ownership in a shipwreck, abandonment must be shown by
express acts." 200 The Fourth Circuit found that express abandonment
embodied traditional admiralty law because in admiralty law, when
articles were lost at sea, the title remained with the true owner.20 1 In
addition, "[a]n inference of abandonment is permitted, but only when
no owner appears. '202
The Fourth Circuit distinguished its adjudication of La Galga from
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Fairport because the Sixth Circuit ap-
plied the implied abandonment standard to a privately-owned vessel,
not a vessel owned by a sovereign.20 3 "To adopt an implied abandon-
ment standard in this context would casually divest sovereigns of ships
which sank against their will and to which they still lay claim. ' 204
After the Fourth Circuit determined that express abandonment
governed the application of the ASA to sovereign vessels embedded
and submerged in state lands, it determined that Sea Hunt and Vir-
ginia must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that La Galga
had been abandoned.20 - The Court of Appeals disagreed with the
lower court's interpretation of Article XX of the 1763 Treaty because
it found that the plain language of the Treaty 20 6 failed to meet the high
standard of clear and convincing evidence necessary to prove express
abandonment.2 0 7 Article XX never mentioned shipwrecks, vessels,
frigates, warships, or any other common word that could have re-
ferred to La Galga, whereas other provisions of the Treaty explicitly
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. This belief completely negates the idea of inferential abandonment. Anyone could
then appear and claim ownership of title even if they had abandoned the ship.
203. Sea Hunt Inc., 221 F.3d at 642.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 644.
206. Article XX of the 1763 Treaty states:
His Catholick [sic] Majesty cedes and guaranties, in full right, to his Britannic Majesty,
Florida, with Fort St. Augustin, and the Bay of Pensacola, as well as all that Spain
possesses on the continent of North America, to the East or to the South East of the
river Mississippi. And, in general, every thing that depends on said countries and lands,
with the sovereignty, property, possession, and all rights, acquired by treaties or other-
wise .... So that the Catholick [sic] King cedes and makes over the whole to the said
King and to the Crown of Great Britain, and that in the most ample manner and form
.... It is moreover stipulated, that his Catholick [sic] Majesty shall have power to cause
all the effects that may belong to him, to be brought away, whether it be artillery or
other things.




mentioned vessels, ships of war, factories, and artillery.20 8 "When the
parties to the 1763 Treaty intended to cede non-territorial state prop-
erty, they did so with great particularity. Yet, nowhere does the
Treaty specifically mention the cession of shipwrecks. ' '20 9 Moreover,
Spain ceded only what it owned on the continent of North America,
which did not include items in the sea or seabed.2 10 Although the
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its narrow holding applied only to
sovereign shipwrecks, it stated that, even under a standard of implied
abandonment, La Galga could not have been found to be abandoned
because after the sinking Spain attempted to salvage it, the ship re-
mained on Spain's naval registry, and Spain asserted a right to title
after Sea Hunt brought the action. 2t' In addition, the technology to
salvage the scattered shipwreck had only recently become available.2 12
Hence, the court reversed the lower court's decision and held that
Spain had not expressly abandoned La Galga.213
III. ANALYSIS
The Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA) passed, in light of new tech-
nologies, with the overriding goal of preserving historic shipwrecks
and allowing more people greater access to abandoned shipwrecks.
Understanding the process of shipwreck recovery is necessary to truly
comprehend the effect of emerging technology on the ASA. The Co-
lumbus-America Discovery Group (Group) provides an excellent
illustration.
An ocean engineer, a journalist, and a geologist comprised the
Group created to locate and recover the S.S. Central America.214 The
Group began by raising an initial $200,000 from investors to create a
map, largely from historical accounts and meteorological data, detail-
ing a 1400-square mile area in the Atlantic Ocean where the ship
might be located.215 The Group secured another $1.4 million from
investors and began using modern technology to find the wreck.216
After forty days of searching the area, the Group discovered a poten-
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 645-46.
211. Id. at 647.
212. Sea Hunt Inc., 221 F.3d at 647.
213. Id.
214. Justin S. Stern, Note: Smart Salvage: Extending Traditional Maritime Law to Include In-
tellectual Property Rights in Historic Shipwrecks, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2489, 2489 n.5-6 (2000).
215. Id.
216. Id. The Group used wide sonar technology that sent sonic images to the boat's com-
puters to scan the ocean floor. Id.
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tial wreck one and one-half miles below the water's surface. 21 7 Be-
cause divers would have been subject to four thousand pounds-per-
square-inch of pressure, a water temperature of thirty-eight degrees
Fahrenheit, and total darkness, they sent a twelve thousand pound re-
mote-operated robot with a camera to retrieve artifacts from the
wreck.218 The Group searched fruitlessly for two years before it de-
cided to upgrade the robot.219 Within a few months, the robot's sonar
images showed the ship's sidewheels. 220
The Group spent years searching for the ship, often fruitlessly, and
at great expense. Their search is typical, particularly considering the
effects of improved technology on a search. The drafters of the ASA
failed to consider the true impact of emerging technology and its costs
on the goal of preservation, or the effect these two areas would have
on the term "abandoned." "There is agreement that valuable historic
materials may be found underwater, that these historic materials may
deserve investigation and preservation, and that the public may have
the right of access to them. The disagreement revolves around who
owns the materials ... and who has the right to dispose of them.
' 221
A. Expenses Associated with Historic Shipwreck Preservation
Improved technology continues to emerge and alter the face of
shipwreck recovery and preservation. In order to understand the
technology and its preservation aspects, it is first necessary to under-
stand the costs involved.
Opponents stress that when Congress initially considered the ASA,
the Act carried with it several stipulations that became diluted during
its passage.222 For example, House Report 1195 gave the Secretary of
Interior the power to transfer title of a shipwreck to a state only upon
a finding that the state actually maintained a shipwreck management
program; if a state failed to meet the standards of preservation, it
would automatically lose title to the shipwreck. 223 However, as en-
acted, the ASA awards absolute title to the states with no contingen-
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2489-90.
219. Stern, supra note 214, at 2490.
220. Id.
221. Abbass, supra note 104, at 261. On the continual tension between archeologists and sal-
vors, D.K. Abbass comments, "Not all lawyers are toadies to wreck-raiders hell-bent on ripping
glittering treasure from glamorous shipwrecks. Not all archaeologists are effete intellectual
snobs determined to keep important historical sites closed to the public." Id.
222. McLaughlin, supra note 75, at 182-84.
223. Id. at 182. H.R. 74 and H.R. 132 also required that states take on additional duties with
the award of title. Id. at 182-183.
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cies or requirements.2 24 How can the states or the federal government
comply with the ASA's underlying purpose of preservation if no real
requirement exists for preservation?
The prominent reason that these stipulations were removed from
the enacted ASA is monetary.22 5 Preservation, active management of
the sites, and regulation of states with title would have placed a heavy
financial burden on state and federal governments.2 26  Ironically,
states themselves caused much of the damage to shipwrecks by gener-
ating insufficient surveys to locate historic and abandoned shipwrecks
prior to dredging projects in which artifacts located on the seabed per-
ished.2 27 The surveys, and subsequent salvage and preservation of the
wreck, require extensive funds.2 28 "The intent of the ASA was to pre-
vent a damaging free-for-all over shipwreck artifacts. Perversely, the
Act's result may be a system of 'destructive retention."'12 29
The costs associated with funding an underwater expedition range
into the millions.2 30 A successful endeavor requires a diverse group of
experts and the funds to afford the rapidly advancing technology.
Determining the location of cultural deposits may involve such di-
verse disciplines as mathematics, probability theory, the behavior of
sound and light, and survey methodology. Understanding the na-
ture of the site, and how it came to be, involves engineering, marine
biology, chemistry, physics, mechanics, and navigational science.
The social sciences and the fine arts also lend assistance in solving
U[nderwater] C[ultural] R[esource] riddles.231
In addition, a state hires professional archaeologists, most likely on
contract from universities, to do the research. 232 Unlike federal or
224. Id. at 183. Mr. Keller, the attorney for Zych stated:
Unfortunately, the ASA has permitted (and even encouraged) some state historic pres-
ervation officials to believe that only they have the wisdom and the knowledge neces-
sary to care for historic shipwrecks. Such administrators are willing to sacrifice the
wrecks they claim to be protecting in a self-righteous and vainglorious assertion of au-
thority. As I said at the beginning, this is not an encouraging tale.
Keller, supra note 119, at 251.




229. Id. at 185.
230. One commentator stated:
They do not realize that it takes millions and millions of dollars to salvage one ship-
wreck. You do not do it with $100,000, you know. It takes large amounts of talented
personnel, highly technical people. It is a very dangerous business; a lot of people lose
their lives or get wounded.
Hearings, supra note 77, at 145.
231. Robol, supra note 121, at 304.
232. See Hearings, supra note 54, at 60.
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state governments that are restricted by the expenses, commercial sal-
vors have a staff of archaeologists and preservationists who make a
living by salvaging and preserving these artifacts for resale. 233 Most
salvage operations start by determining the location of a shipwreck
through library research. 234 After determining where a ship sank and
its importance, a promoter will look for investors to fund the explora-
tion and excavation if the ship is found. 235 Even before a successful
salvage operation commences, a salvor spends thousands of dollars on
the following: negotiating sessions with investors, lenders, and govern-
ment officials; drafting of documents, such as financial prospectuses,
partnership agreements, employment contracts, equipment leases, and
press releases; and if all these precautions fail, litigation.236
Considerable expense exists in excavating and storing the artifacts
properly. Excavation is a destructive activity that changes a site for-
ever and, once done, can never be repeated;237 hence, extensive
money and resources are spent to ensure proper location and ade-
quate recovery of artifacts. Proper storage is necessary so that the
artifact will be available for future research and study. 238 Unfortu-
nately, the government, often unable to manage the large costs associ-
ated with salvaging operations and preservation of the artifacts, allows
these insights into cultural history to deteriorate in a museum
basement.239
Several courts adjudicating ASA cases were aware of the considera-
ble costs associated with salvaging a shipwreck and that, often, com-
mercial salvors expend the time and resources to find these wrecks
while the title holder takes no action. 240 For example, the Seventh
Circuit expressed sympathy for Zych. The court stated,
233. Id. at 61.
You see, I have a staff a large staff, a larger staff than any State or the Federal Govern-
ment, of archaeologists. They are all accredited and have been working with me for
years. I also have a large staff of preservationists. They have been working with me for
years. We have the largest preservation laboratory probably in the world, and the best
museum pertaining to this type of material. We have excellent curators.
Id. (statement of Mel Fisher urging the House to consider another alternative to the ASA, such
as archaeological guidelines, which would be more effective, cost efficient, and allow the ro-
mance of discovery to exist).
234. Edward R. Horan, Organizing, Manning, and Financing a Treasure Salvage Expedition,
30 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 235, 235 (1999).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Abbass, supra note 104, at 262.
238. Id.
239. See Hearings, supra note 77, at 146.
240. Zych, 746 F. Supp. at 1351.
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The court is not without some sympathy for plaintiff's position. It
was the plaintiff who expended considerable time and resources in
pursing the wrecks. Without plaintiff's efforts, the wrecks might re-
main undiscovered. The State, in contrast, appears to have sat idly
by, showing no interest in the wrecks until plaintiff brought this law-
suit. Plaintiff's contention that he should receive ownership, or at
least a salvage award, for his efforts is attractive.2 41
The expenses associated with historic shipwrecks, such as locating,
salvaging, and preserving shipwrecks, are closely tied to the emerging
technology that enables the rescue of shipwrecks. 242 This technology
remains prohibitively expensive, allowing only the very wealthy to
search for shipwrecks. However, this technology will become less ex-
pensive with time and more readily available to sport divers and ama-
teur sleuths.
B. Emerging Technology
Not only has recent technology created the ability to further search
the remains of shipwrecks, but it also resulted in increased exploration
of oceans by novice divers. Beginning in the 1960s, improvements in
scuba diving equipment opened the oceans to sport and recreational
divers.243 As a result, many more historic ships are accessed and vis-
ited by archaeologists, sport divers, and salvors interested in recrea-
tional, historical, and commercial discoveries.2 44 Previously, the only
restraint to harvesting these limited resources by multiple individuals
was the limited technology. 245 However, the new and more readily
241. Id.
242. "Within the last three years, advances in sonar technology have made it possible to locate
shipwrecks in deep water with greater precision, and for less money, than with the technology
that was previously available." Deep Sea Research, 883 F. Supp. at 1353. The new technology,
such as pictures from a sonar record, reduced costs from $20,000.00 per day (the cost of blindly
operating a search vehicle in the dark) to $1,750.00 for the pictures that detailed the location of
the ship. Horrell, supra note 59, at 336. In addition, deep sea diving robots, an improvement in
scientific technology, allow for underwater exploration as well as preservation by photographing
the wrecks, thereby providing an alternative to destruction of the wreck in order to catalogue
artifacts. William J. Broad, Deepest Wrecks Now Visible to Undersea Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
2, 1993, at Cl.
243. See Giesecke, supra note 116, at 168. Behrens, who abandoned the Captain Lawrence,
used heavy boots and a hard hat connected to an oxygen hose while diving because SCUBA was
not available in the 1930s. Fairport Int'l Exploration v. The Shipwrecked Vessel Known as Cap-
tain Lawrence, 913 F. Supp. 552, 555 (N.D. Mich. 1995). During the advent of SCUBA in 1957, a
waterproof watch that merely told time cost $99.95. Today, however, SCUBA divers buy
watches integrating all the capabilities of a dive computer for $800. See Scuba Diving Magazine,
Gear Buying Guide: Then and Now, at http://www.scubadiving.com/gear/thennow/, (last visited
July 22, 2001).
244. See Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.
432) 365, 365 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.).
245. Hearings, supra note 65, at 255.
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accessible technology seems only to be controlled by the enactment of
the ASA, which aims to protect and preserve historic shipwrecks.
An examination of the new technology is required before proceed-
ing to its effect on abandonment because
these technological developments have sharpened the debate be-
tween treasure-hunters and preservationists. Finding and exploring
the Titanic, two-and-one half miles down, has demonstrated to both
groups their capacity to reach the vast majority of wrecks, which lie
in shallower coastal waters. Should we enlist the new accessibility
to shipwrecks, and visibility of them, in the service of an underwater
gold rush? Or should we, instead, use the new technology to pro-
vide a substitute for a physical recovery of wrecks, in the form of
images and data for the public benefit.2 46
The ocean's mysteries will not remain hidden from this rapidly devel-
oping technology; in fact, limited knowledge is our only restraint in
underwater research and technology.247 In the past, excavation of lost
ships has been confined to ships in shallow water; however, wrecks in
deep ocean waters, which encompass ninety-seven percent of the
world's oceans, remained unreachable. 248 New advances include bet-
ter deep-diving robots, manned submersibles, accurate magnetic and
acoustic mapping, improved navigation, and hydrographic software. 249
Perhaps the biggest advance, and the one most welcome in the eyes
of preservationists, occurred in the field of underwater photogra-
phy.250 Divers traditionally went to depths of 150 feet, but cameras
and robots now have the ability to dive down as far as 2.5 miles into
deep ocean water.251 Today, deep-diving robots and manned submer-
sibles travel miles underwater with underwater laser cameras that dis-
charge beams of light that can capture images five to eight times
farther than the mix of floodlights and cameras traditionally used in
246. James A.R. Nafziger, The Titanic Revisited, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 311, 312 (1999). To
locate the Titanic, Robert D. Ballard and Jean-Louis Michel used ANGUS, a camera steered by
sonic beacons on the seafloor and blindly dragged by the researchers from the surface. Robert
D. Ballard, How We Found the Titanic, 168 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 696, 700 (1985). The American
divers also employed a vehicle they named "Argo," consisting of a steel frame carrying video
cameras, side-scan sonar, and a computerized timing system. Id.
247. See Hearings, supra note 76, at 255.
248. Broad, supra note 242, at C1.
249. Nafziger, supra note 246, at 312.
250. See Broad, supra note 242, at Cl.
251. William J. Broad, Deep-Sea Scavenging Gets Easier, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at E6.
These advancements particularly aid divers when no visibility exists. For instance, an archeolo-
gist from the Michigan Department of State dove to the Captain Lawrence and discovered the
visibility in the area to be five to ten feet, which quickly turned to nothing because the silt easily
moved up. Fairport Int'l Exploration, 913 F. Supp. at 556.
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deep sea diving.252 In the past twenty years, advancements in photo-
graphic exploration have developed rapidly. In the early 1980s, ex-
plorers used clumsy underwater robots with attached cameras to
photograph underwater wrecks.253 Within five years, a new camera
had been developed using small computer circuits and optical fibers
reinforced with Kevlar, a lightweight polymer as strong as steel, that
sent data between the robot and man.254 This deep-diving robot lo-
cated a fourth-century Roman Empire shipwreck, one-half mile un-
derwater; the photographs indicated that in the latter Roman period,
the Empire relied on North Africa for its food and oil.255 These find-
ings have major implications, such as a better understanding of battles
and controversial sinkings.256 For example, salvors discovered a Nazi
battleship that sunk in 1941, which historians believed imploded. 25 7
However, the camera's images indicated that the ship had actually
been scuttled before receiving the final blow from the British
Military. 258
Preservationists laud the recent advances in deep-sea diving robots
because they afford the ability to recover artifacts from wrecks while
preserving the actual location of the artifacts for future research:
"With a deep-diving robot, the company recovered not only pearls,
gold bars and jewelry but wooden beams, olive jars and ballast stones,
recording each item's position for future archaeological analysis.
Even some human teeth were gingerly recovered, including a pre-
eruptive molar of a child." 259
Computers greatly changed the face of deep-sea research. By using
hydrographic software packages, computers can now monitor and re-
cord the magnetic, acoustic, and positional data taken during the
252. Broad, supra note 242, at C1. Much of this new underwater technology was originally
perfected by the military in secret during the cold war; however, in recent years, private indus-
tries, such as off shore drilling enterprises, have caught up with military developments. Id. Wil-
liam J. Broad, New Tools Yield Clues to Disasters at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 1999, at Fl.
253. Broad, supra note 242, at C1.
254. Id. Because the camera was covered in Titanium, a strong, but light metal, it resisted
damage under the weight of the water and saltwater corrosion. Id. The cameras, which emit
black and white photographs, cost around $500,000 or more. Id.
255. Id. A marine archeologist located large clay jugs that indicated the Roman culture from
different time periods. Id.
256. Broad, supra note 242, at C1. In 1992, the cameras explored the 1942 battle of the
Guadalcanal, known as Ironbottom Sound because of the fourteen ships that sank. Id. A Navy
historian commented that they had a better understanding of the battle because many of the




259. Broad, supra note 251 at E6.
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search of a wreck site.260 Geographic Information Systems, a com-
puter-based system, analyzes spatially related data; additionally,
graphic images, such as maps or site plans can be linked to textual
data.2 61 Computer programs also aid a salvor or archeologist in deter-
mining where to search for a shipwreck.262 With the aid of computer
design programs, digitized historic maps can be placed over modern
navigation charts to identify the shoreline changes with regard to the
location of historic shipwrecks. 263
Within the past ten years, a navigational satellite known as a Global
Positioning System (GPS) now gives an accurate reading of a ship's
position. 264 A GPS calculates a ship's location by measuring the dis-
tance between the ship and various satellites. 265 Although advanced
GPSs are prohibitively expensive, the less expensive models still allow
a discovered shipwreck to be located again for further research or
salvaging.2 66
The most expensive technology lies in deep-water survey instru-
ments, such as deep-towed sonar and sub-bottom profiler systems,
that take acoustic images at the floor's bottom up to 750 meters
wide.267 Similarly, Remote Operated Vehicles (ROVs) are underwa-
ter robots used to collect artifacts and document a site, which attach to
a manned submersible or ship and carry video and still cameras, lights,
and mechanical arms.268 Many companies now specialize in explora-
tion technology, selling such items as seismic recording systems that
create images from below the surface by measuring sound269 and mag-
netometers that assist salvors by locating and measuring the weak
magnetic fields produced by iron and iron oxides found in the soil
surrounding buried objects from which a map can be created. 270 One
salvor praised even the most minute improvement in magnetometer
technology because the smallest advance greatly increases a salvor's
ability to locate a shipwreck. "Yet in the end I've discovered wreck-
260. Roderick Mather, Technology and the Search for Shipwrecks, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 175,
181 (1999).
261. Id. at 181.
262. Id. at 176.
263. Id. at 176.
264. Id. at 180. Prior to the development of Global Positioning Systems, landmarks, celestial
navigation, and radio beacons from shore had been used to secure positioning. Id.
265. Mather, supra note 260, at 180.
266. Id. at 181.
267. Id. at 182.
268. Id. at 183.
269. For further descriptions of this product and its uses, see http://www.geometrics.com/prod-




age from ships dating to the 17th and 18th centuries that had gone
undetected using previous magnetometers, and I've used 4 different
mags over the past 20 years."'27'
This newfound technology is best understood as applied to perhaps
the most famous shipwreck in the world: the Titanic. Until recently,
the public believed that only a gigantic iceberg could sink a ship as
stable as the Titanic; however, because the ship had been lost in water
two and one-half miles deep and out of a researcher's reach, the actual
reason for the sinking could never be confirmed.272 With the use of
new technologies, such as sound waves, computer simulations, ultra-
sound, and metallurgic analysis of the Titanic's steel, a group of re-
searchers found that the damage was not a large gaping hole, as
previously believed, but a series of six thin openings in the starboard
hull. 273
One year later, in 1998, scientists discovered further evidence that
failed rivets from the Titanic's hull may have also caused, or at least
contributed to, the sinking of the ship.274 The rivets were found
through sonar technology that probed the hull, which lay embedded in
fifty-five feet of mud.275 Scientists hypothesize that the narrow slits,
discovered only one year earlier, resulted when rivets deteriorated
causing the hull to pop open.276 For almost a century, 277 the world
believed that an iceberg sank the Titanic by tearing a gaping hole in
the ship; however, as a result of new technology developed within the
last few years, scientists discovered that six small slits actually sank the
Titanic.
Most recently, Sea Hunt's discovery of the Spanish warships La
Galga and Juno278 brought to the forefront the problem of technology
in abandoned wrecks. The American, French, and British govern-
ments sided with Spain against Sea Hunt and the State of Virginia.279
271. Alan R. Riebe, Chief Operations Manager, El Salvador Shipwreck Project, http://
www.geometrics.com/Testimonials/testimonials.html (last visited July 22, 2001).
272. William J. Broad, Toppling Theories, Scientists Find 6 Slits, Not Big Gash, Sank Titanic,
N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 8,1997, at Cl.
273. Id. At the time of the sinking, one of the naval architects of the Titanic suggested that
the actual cuts might be quite small; however, his testimony was ignored because it was incom-
prehensible that such a large safe ship could be sunk by a series of small cuts. Id.
274. William J. Broad, Faulty Rivets Emerge as Clues to Titanic Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1998, at Fl.
275. Id.
276. Id. After further researching the content of the rivets, scientists discovered that the riv-
ets had a large amount of slag, causing them to be brittle and prone to fracture. Id.
277. The Titanic sank in 1912. Id.
278. See supra notes 177-182 and accompanying text.
279. Broad, supra note 125, at Al.
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"Legal experts said those nations, and others with long maritime tradi-
tions, are increasingly eager to assert ownership of their old ship-
wrecks now that technology is fast opening the seas to exploration. '280
Sea Hunt has already spent over two million dollars for the recovery
and litigation regarding the two ships and must now decide whether to
appeal the Fourth Circuit's decision281 to the United States Supreme
Court: "There's no case law to support their conclusion. It's un-
charted waters for the shipwreck industry as a whole. '282
The Zych court addressed the issue of new technology when it ex-
cused the insurance company's inactivity because the technology to
find the shipwreck had only recently been developed. 283
There remains, however, the argument that the failure to take any
steps to recover the wreck is sufficient evidence of intent to aban-
don when considered in light of the lapse of 130 years. The Founda-
tion contends that Aetna's failure to act is inconsequential because
the technology has not previously been available to locate the wreck
.... Zych might respond that the lack of late-1980's technology did
not dissuade others from attempting to locate the wreck. In light,
however, of the law's hesitancy to find abandonment and the con-
comitant requirement that abandonment be supported by strong
and convincing evidence, the Court finds that Aetna was not re-
quired to engage in efforts to recover the wreck in order to avoid
abandoning its interest when such efforts would have had minimal
chances for success. 284
The district court forgave Aetna's failure to search for the ship be-
cause it supposed that the search most likely would have been futile;
however, the district court never addressed the fact that Zych and
other salvors succeeded in locating the ship. The new technology also
creates a concern with respect to the issue of abandonment: Under the
new technology, when can an intent to abandon be inferred by a lack
of action now that the new tools are readily available? 285
C. Abandonment
The ASA's failure to define abandonment has led to an increased
amount of shipwreck litigation and a split in the appellate circuits with
280. Id.
281. See supra notes 191-213 and accompanying text. Mr. Benson, the president of Sea Hunt
decided to sail to the Bahamas to meditate over his decision. Broad, supra note 125 at Al.
282. Id.
283. See McLaughlin, supra note 75, at 166.
284. Zych, 755 F. Supp. at 216.
285. "Implied abandonment did not begin to produce legal disputes until the present time
because the technology to locate deep ocean wrecks and bring all or parts of them to the surface
did not exist. Undersea warfare in World War II and its refinements during the Cold War ac-
count for this technological advance." Sweeney, supra note 121, at 194.
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respect to the applicable standard of abandonment. When presented
with the opportunity to clarify the law surrounding abandoned ship-
wrecks, the United States Supreme Court poorly guided the lower
courts by defining abandonment as traditional admiralty law had de-
fined it.286 Unfortunately, the lack of a clear definition for abandon-
ment, express or implied, and the new technologies that significantly
alter the application of abandonment halted modern shipwreck
litigation.
The essential elements of abandonment are an intent to abandon
and an external manifestation of that intent, or an act.2 87 Abandon-
ment may be express, as described, or implied.28 8 When no express
declaration of abandonment exists, implied abandonment may be in-
ferred from lapse of time or non-use.2 89 In Deep Sea Research, the
Supreme Court attempted to resolve the applicable abandonment
standard under the ASA "with the clarification that the meaning of
'abandoned' under the ASA conforms with its meaning under admi-
ralty law."'2 90 The Supreme Court failed to clarify abandonment be-
cause, in maritime law, abandonment may be express or implied
through lapse of time, acts manifesting intent, or an express abandon-
ment.291 The Supreme Court left lower courts to follow the only clear
guideline that remained: abandonment requires an intent to aban-
don.2 92 The question of whether intent must be express or implied
created the current split between the circuits.
The ASA's legislative history and the federal guidelines promulgat-
ing the ASA accept an application of implied abandonment. While
the Act itself leaves the term abandoned undefined, the Senate Com-
286. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
287. George F. Gabel, Jr., 1 AM. JUR. 2d Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 11
(1999). In maritime law, abandonment issues generally arise in two separate instances. The first
is the traditional sense of the word in property law, and the second is in marine insurance when
an insurer of damaged ship or cargo relinquishes control in order to completely recover for its
total loss. Chermside, supra note 33, at 1370. In maritime law, when a vessel sinks, an owner
retains the right to the ship, unless he abandons it by showing an intent and an external manifes-
tation of that intent. De Bardeleben Coal Co. v. Cox, 76 So. 409 (Ala. 1917).
288. Mark Thompson, Comment, Finders Weepers Losers Keepers: United States of America
v. Steinmetz, the Doctrine of State Succession, Maritime Finds, and the Bell of C.S.S. Alabama, 28
CONN. L. REv. 479, 509 (1996). "In the case of ancient shipwrecks, this inference is particularly
strong for to suggest that the owners of a wrecked vessel whose very location had been lost for
centuries can still enforce their rights of ownership stretches fiction to absurd lengths. Id.
289. Id. See also Marex Int'l v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Vessel, 952 F. Supp.
825 (1997) (holding that a vessel was abandoned when neither owners nor heirs had made an
attempt to recover or assert claim since its sinking in 1840).
290. California and State Lands Comm'n., 523 U.S. at 508.
291. Jeffrey T. Scrimo, Comment, Raising the Dead: Improving the Recovery and Management
of Historic Shipwrecks, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 271, 303 (2000).
292. Id.
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mittee determined the applicable standard to be implied abandon-
ment during the drafting of the ASA. 293 The Committee noted that
"[the] term 'abandoned' does not require the original owner to ac-
tively disclaim title or ownership. The abandonment or relinquish-
ment of ownership rights may be implied or otherwise inferred, as by
an owner never asserting any control or otherwise indicating his claim
of possession of the shipwreck. '294 Similarly, the federal guidelines
state that "[b]y not taking any action after a wreck incident either to
mark and subsequently remove the wrecked vessel and its cargo or to
provide legal notice of abandonment . . , an owner shows intent to
give up title. '295
By the committee's definition and the federal rules' guidelines, a
court may infer abandonment when an owner chooses not to salvage
or rescue a wrecked vessel, never claims possession of the ship, or
relinquishes the ship to the insurer by accepting the monetary value of
the ship.296 The Sixth Circuit found that "[t]he evidence, although cir-
cumstantial, clearly demonstrates Wilfred Behrens' intent to abandon
the vessel. '2 97 The totality of Behrens' actions indicated an intent to
abandon the Captain Lawrence: he had no insurance and wrote it off
as a total loss when it sank, he never attempted salvage operations
even though he continued salvage diving, he declined the assistance of
the Coast Guard, he never told his family the location of the ship, and
his family never showed any interest in the ship.298
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's application of an implied abandon-
ment standard, the Fourth Circuit applied express abandonment. The
Fourth Circuit read the statutory text to mandate express abandon-
ment because a shipwreck is abandoned when an owner relinquishes
his rights.299
The statute thus provides that a shipwreck is abandoned only where
the owner has relinquished ownership rights. When an owner
comes before the court to assert his rights, relinquishment would be
293. Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 432)
365, 366 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.).
294. Id.
295. Abandoned Shipwreck Act Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 50116, 50120 (Dec. 4, 1990).
296. Id. Most often, however, the insurer is a party in the litigation and involved in the deter-
mination of abandonment. See Zych, 941 F.2d at 525; Fairport Int'l Exploration, 105 F.3d at
1078.
297. Fairport Int'l Exploration, 105 F.3d at 1081.
298. Id.
299. Sea Hunt Inc., 221 F.3d at 640. See also Findings, 43 U.S.C. §2101(b) (stating "included in
the range of resources are certain abandoned shipwrecks, which have been deserted and to
which the owner has relinquished ownership rights with no retention").
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hard, if not impossible, to show. Requiring express abandonment
where an owner makes a claim accords with the statutory text.300
The Fourth Circuit further disputed the application of the implied
abandonment standard.
Further, although the legislative history states that abandonment
may be implied, it may be implied "as by an owner never asserting
any control over or otherwise indicating his claim of possession."
An owner who comes forward has definitely indicated his claim of
possession, and in such a case abandonment cannot be implied.30'
The Fourth Circuit takes the force out of any standard of abandon-
ment by finding that any time an owner makes a claim in court, the
ship may not be abandoned; the crux of abandonment is the owner's
intent. An owner shows intent through express r2'nunciation of his
claim to property, or his intent may be inferred frons his actions. The
Fourth Circuit effectively sent a message that any owner may idly wait
for over a hundred years for another to expend the funds and the time
to locate and salvage the shipwreck. Then, at an opportune time, the
owner may legally step into a courtroom, claim that he never intended
to abandon the ship, and successfully retain title because he has not
yet expressly renounced his claim to the ship.302
According to the court in Sea Hunt, "Spain has vigorously asserted
its interest in the wreck";30 3 however, Spain merely intervened in the
litigation, and that was only after the United States alerted Spain to
the impending litigation. 30 4 Under the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of express abandonment, an owner merely needs to assert claim of
title to retain ownership of the ship.30 5 Is the court nullifying any pos-
sibility that abandonment could ever be found? The Fourth Circuit
destroyed the purpose of the ASA by applying the express abandon-
ment standard because a state will never have the opportunity to ob-
tain possession of a ship's title. At the last hour, an owner who has
been standing in the wings may claim title and thwart the preservation
goals of the state. Effectively, the Fourth Circuit reinstated the law of
300. Sea Hunt Inc., 221 F.3d at 640-41.
301. Id. at 641.
302. Broad, supra note 125, at Al; Duffy, supra note 185, at A4.
303. Sea Hunt Inc., 221 F.3d at 647.
304. Id. at 634.
305. The court also relied heavily on the fact that the ship belonged to the Spanish govern-
ment and, therefore, was a sovereign vessel. Id. at 643. The court treated a foreign nation's
military vessel the same as it would have an American military vessel, which requires an affirma-
tive act to constitute abandonment. Id. at 641. However, the court reaffirmed its previous find-
ings in Columbus-America that express abandonment is the standard under the ASA because a
lesser standard would extend beyond the intended boundaries of the ASA. Id. at 640.
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salvage, allowing an owner to salvage, sell, or destroy the ship even if
he let it lie for hundreds of years without notice or concern.
If express abandonment nullifies the preservation purposes of the
ASA, does an implied abandonment standard better satisfy these
goals? Application of an implied abandonment standard proves diffi-
cult in light of the previously unavailable technology that only now
opens up the ocean to many would-be salvors and owners. In light of
new technology, when does abandonment occur?
By applying the implied abandonment standard, courts need to de-
termine when the technology to locate the ship became available, who
can afford the technology, and at what point abandonment occurs for
failure to take advantage of emerging technologies; hence, along with
nonuse and passage of time, a court will account for the availability of
technology. This new question essentially requires a court to look
through a crystal ball. Because technology is always advancing and
improving, at what point do courts decide that it is advanced enough
to locate a shipwreck?
Will the standard be that a diver or salvor expended the time and
energy where a title owner failed to take action? Or, will we require a
constant "reclaiming" of ships in which title owners continually re-
search the technology and its costs in order to prove that an owner has
not yet abandoned the shipwreck? If so, an individual title owner may
not have the funds to proceed. He could go to the state for financial
assistance, but because he did not abandon the ship, the state will not
want to help in light of its limited resources and no clear prospect of
financial gain. Moreover, to go to a private salvor would require an
owner to give up part of his treasure or ownership, of which he clearly
claims title. In order to truly satisfy the ASA's goals of preservation
and protect an owner's rights to title, courts should adopt an implied
abandonment standard requiring a clear and convincing standard of
proof.
IV. IMPACT
Admiralty courts initially developed maritime law in response to
the unique conditions created by living, working, and trading on the
sea.30 6 The Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA) altered maritime law
by explicitly forbidding the application of the law of finds and the law
306. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Internet and Public International Law: Law in a
Shrinking World: The Interaction of Science and Technology with International Law, 88 Ky. L. J.
809, 817 (1999). "Maritime law developed an entirely distinct set of rules governing these needs
built around the reality that the ship and her crew were on their own." Id. at 317. Granted, the
ship and the crew are no longer completely on their own as a result of the technologies that now
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of salvage to historic shipwrecks. 30 7 While the drafters of the ASA
hoped to clear up confusion surrounding shipwreck litigation and pro-
mote the goal of preservation, in reality, the ASA removed historic
shipwrecks from the courts that best understood their adjudication,
and thus created even more confusion and uncertainty.
The ASA creates uncertainty when a salvor cannot determine in
advance whether a wreck is "abandoned" or "embedded" and
therefore subject to the ASA and questions of fact to be decided by
the court. A salvor could expend immense resources to locate, sur-
vey and salvage a wreck only to have the court later rule that the
salvor is entitled to nothing because the ASA displaces the law of
salvage. 308
Abandonment is the crux of the ASA because once a court declares
a ship abandoned, the state receives title; then, the action falls out of
the purview of admiralty courts, and the state receives the right to
preserve the ship and use its own salvors.309 Hence, the salvor who
expended the time and effort to locate and salvage the ship receives
nothing. However, if a court finds that the ship is not abandoned,
then the true owner retains title. The action remains in admiralty
court because it maintains jurisdiction over claims involving salvage.
Because the true owner exists and the salvor saved his ship, the salvor
will receive a salvage award consistent with his efforts. 310
But, how does a finding of abandonment affect the goals of
preservationists? According to the ASA, when a state receives title to
the historic shipwreck, it then works to achieve the goals of preserva-
tion.3' 1 No such requirement exists when the true owner retains title;
he retains the right to dispose of his property as he wishes. Applying
express abandonment will return more ships to their true owners, re-
gardless of the owners' inaction and apathy towards the wreck;
whereas, an implied abandonment standard will transfer more ship-
wrecks to a state, allowing them to preserve and protect the
shipwreck.
Courts adjudicating cases under the ASA became mired in the es-
sential meaning of "abandonment." A definitive time period for
abandonment, which considers the availability of technology, would
eliminate much of the confusion surrounding the definition of aban-
connect them to the world. However, the sea still maintains a life and rules separate from those
created on land.
307. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
308. Yukon Recovery v. Certain Abandoned Property, 205 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000).
309. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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donment. The International Law Association drafted a proposal in
which it defined abandonment. A wreck is declared abandoned if the
owner does not recover the shipwreck within twenty-five years from
the discovery of the technology to retrieve it or, in the absence of
technology, fifty years after the owner's last assertion of ownership
interest. 312 A statutory definition, however, fails to adequately rem-
edy the problem because it only accounts for lapse of time, without
considering any of the other crucial factors, such as nonuse, technol-
ogy, expense, or intent.
A statutory definition of abandonment would actually be more arbi-
trary than a court's application of implied and express abandonment
because it would only consider the amount of time the shipwreck
spent at the bottom of the sea, not facts, circumstances, or even an
owner's declaration of ownership. Further, even under a statutory
definition of abandonment, the question would still remain: How do
courts determine when the new technology became available, and
does the high expense of such technology factor into a determination?
Because new discoveries and advances occur in technology every day,
a defense claim always would exist under a statutory definition of
abandonment that the necessary technology only recently developed;
thereby, tolling the statute until a later date. A court would expend
copious time wading through complicated analysis, expert testimony,
and proof of technical discoveries and advances, and fail to remember
the basic definition of abandonment and the ASA's spirit of
preservation.
Currently, the appellate courts apply either express or implied
abandonment. Under the express abandonment standard, the ASA
becomes a nullity. According to express abandonment, an owner pos-
sesses the right to step forward at any point during the litigation and
claim title, even when he has failed to assert any previous ownership
interest. An owner will never expressly abandon a valuable historic
312. David J. Bederman, Historic Salvage and the Law of the Sea, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 99, 115-16 (1998). According to Professor Bederman, the ILA's time limit is too short to
assume that an interested party would have abandoned the property. Id. He also claims that
such a time limit is contrary to general maritime law under the express abandonment standard of
Columbus-America. Id. at 117-18. In response to the confusion surrounding abandonment, sev-
eral states enacted laws defining specific abandonment. See Douglas Cohen, Should Noli
Forfendi Apply to Sunken Ships?, 73 B.U. L. REV. 193, 210-212 (1993) (Salvage of Abandoned
Shipwrecks and Other Underwater Archeological Resources grants title to North Carolina of all
shipwrecks that remain unclaimed for more than ten years; Massachusetts receives title after one
hundred years). See also Clarissa A. Kong, Note: Charting Through Protection for Historic Ship-
wrecks Found in U.S. Territorial Waters: Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or
Vessels, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 112-18 (2000) (suggesting federal historic shipwreck management
National Marine Sanctuaries Act).
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shipwreck because he will always find a tenuous link between himself
and a ship; hence, courts eradicate the ASA's overriding goal of pres-
ervation when they apply such a stringent standard. As a result, a
shipwreck will never be deemed "abandoned" under the ASA and its
title will not revert to the states. Because an owner would retain title,
he would have the ability to destroy, salvage, or allow the ship to dete-
riorate in the water, which is contrary to the ASA's goals of shipwreck
preservation and public use.
The essential question remains: What role will emerging technology
play in shipwreck preservation? Advances in underwater recovery
drastically alter the outcome of litigation surrounding the ASA and
how courts determine abandonment.
If technological feasibility is to be a measure of excusable inaction,
then the window of opportunity for doing nothing is clearly closing
on owners, and recovery delay excused on such grounds should
soon disappear from most shipwreck cases as courts take notice that
technology has put all underwater wrecks within the reach of those
with deep pockets and time to search. The future for a defense of
delay excused by the absence of a commercially practicable recov-
ery venture proposal is more difficult to predict, and would make
excusable recovery delay on the part of the owner that is unexcused
on the part of the salvor.313
Courts forgive owners who choose not to undertake the huge efforts
and costs necessary to recover a shipwreck because of technical in-
feasibility. Yet, as technology becomes more advanced and economi-
cal, owners no longer enjoy this excuse for inaction. Under express
abandonment, an owner may idly watch as "his" shipwreck is located
and salvaged, only to enter the picture at the last moment and claim
ownership. Because he had never expressly abandoned the ship and
the technology that recovered his ship was only recently developed,
the court will justify his lack of interest and action as a result of tech-
nical impracticability.
Superficially, express abandonment appears to be the best standard
because it follows maritime law's strong protection of a true owner's
property rights by acknowledging a presumption against a finding of
abandonment. 314 However, the law should not protect owners who
313. John Paul Jones, The United States Supreme Court and Treasure Salvage: Issues Remain-
ing After Brother Jonathan, 30 MAR. L. & CoM. 205, 216 (1999).
314. Fairport Int'l Exploration v. The Shipwrecked Vessel Known as Captain Lawrence, 177
F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 1999).
We think that the apparent divergence of authority masks a degree of underlying agree-
ment. A close reading of the cases reveals a uniform concern that courts impose a high
burden on those who argue that an owner abandoned property that sank against his
will. To overcome this significant hurdle, the claimant may prove abandonment by in-
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the )retically would have abandoned the ship but for. the fact that it
now possesses value. A finding of implied abandonment would still
guard an owner's property interest as long as a court would also apply
an exacting standard of clear and convincing evidence, 315 which places
a h gh burden on the state to prove abandonment. Implied abandon-
me:it with a clear and convincing standard requires the court to look
at E 11 the factors, such as technology, expense, and the claimant's past
att(:mpts to salvage the wreck, and determine if all these factors con-
stit-ite abandonment. Hence, a court would analyze the totality of the
facl ors. By evaluating the available technology and scrutinizing own-
ers' attempts to use this technology, idle owners would no longer have
the excuse of technological impracticality unless the technology really
did not exist.
Under the implied abandonment standard, a court would set flexi-
ble and realistic guidelines to determine whether a ship has in fact
been abandoned. What effect should be given to the "lapse of time"
faclor considering the recent and rapid advances in underwater re-
sea 'ch technology? In the future, lapse of time may no longer be a
faclor because the technology currently exists to locate and salvage
lon.- lost ships. Additionally, should a true owner without adequate
finE.nces be required to salvage a shipwreck in order to retain title?
Th .se factors are immutable and will continually change as technol-
ogy advances and becomes less expensive. By applying implied aban-
dor ment, a court possesses the flexibility to consider all these factors
and how these questions apply to the particular case at bar.
Ihe implied abandonment standard requiring clear and convincing
evidence could be construed to be the same as express abandonment
because clear and convincing requires a higher level of proof than a
mere inference of abandonment. Express abandonment awards the
latent owner of shipwreck title regardless of his efforts, the lapse of
tim-, or his future plans for the shipwreck; whereas, implied abandon-
erence as well as by express deed. The proposition finds support even from those
.ases cited as examples of the doctrine of express abandonment.
Id. a: 499.
31 i. In Fairport International, the dissent agreed that implied abandonment was the appropri-
ate s:andard under the ASA; but she argued for "strong proof" of abandonment as opposed to
the r iajority's finding of clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 502 (J. Moore, dissenting). While
the j idge found no case law explicitly requiring a preponderance of the evidence standard, she
felt ihat the clear and convincing evidence standard was counter to the express preservation
goal! of the ASA by taking historic shipwrecks out of the state's hands and placing them, more
ofter, in the hands of the true owners. Id. at 502-03. The court of appeals in Fairport rejected
the I reponderance of the evidence standard applied by the lower courts in Fairport and Brother
John Id. at 500. "This burden of proof accords with maritime law and with the protection of
privz te property rights against appropriation by the state." Id. at 501.
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ment looks at all the circumstantial evidence surrounding a shipwreck,
and a court considers an owner's inaction and non-use. Adding the
clear and convincing standard would require courts to do more than a
cursory review of the evidence; it would force the court to weigh the
competing interests of an owner and the goals of preservation. Ini-
tially, the clear and convincing standard could hinder the goals of
preservation because the state would not receive title to every histori-
cal shipwreck. The court would have large discretion in applying the
factors; therefore, it should also look at the intended goals of the
owner and his intentions in claiming ownership now to further aid
preservation.
The implied abandonment standard allows courts to look at the re-
ality of a particular case. For instance, an owner of a historic ship-
wreck desiring to profit from a salvor's discovery will want to earn as
much money as possible from the salvor's finding. The owner may
want to sell the ship to a museum or a salvage company for immediate
profit. In contrast, a state may not have the funds or inclination to
begin the preservation process and may allow the ship to remain dete-
riorating in the water. The court may decide that a true owner who
maintains title may enact the goals of preservation better than the
state.
Consequently, the spirit of preservation may not immediately be
met upon implementation of this standard, but will be advanced fur-
ther by a flexible and realistic application of the following factors:
nonuse, lapse of time considering the advent of technology, availabil-
ity of technology, expenses associated with technology, and owner's
intent in claiming possession after an extended period of time. The
high standard of clear and convincing evidence would require courts
to determine whether or not the evidence offered satisfies abandon-
ment; a court would not speculate, but would examine all these factors
in light of admiralty's favoritism for the owner while also attempting
to fulfill the goals of preservation.
V. CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA) in
1987, it intended to create a uniform law applicable to all historic ship-
wrecks and to protect these ships from sport divers and clumsy sal-
vors. The ASA awards title to the state if the shipwreck is embedded
in a state land, submerged in water, and abandoned. Additionally, the
ASA explicitly states that the law of salvage and the law of finds,
which admiralty courts traditionally applied in shipwreck litigation, no
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loni;er are sufficient because they do not adequately protect this valu-
abk cultural asset.
Because the ASA failed to define abandonment, the courts have
splil as to the appropriate standard for abandonment, express or im-
plielJ. Moreover, the new technological advances, which opened the
dee)) sea to more salvors and archaeologists, further complicated this
detc rmination because, for the first time, an owner possessed the tools
to successfully salvage a ship. Express abandonment completely nulli-
fies the ASA's purpose of preservation because it awards title to the
true owner regardless of his intent, the new technology, expense, or
non ise. Using implied abandonment with a clear and convincing
standard of proof, courts will begin to fulfill the goals of preservation
because this standard acknowledges the true owner's strong property
inte rest while weighing the benefit to society.
Historic shipwrecks represent more than an interest in real property
or t commercial land transaction; they contain amazing hidden
treasures and give insight into our past cultural history. The ASA in-
tenced to protect the cultural past by eradicating salvage law from
historic shipwrecks. By limiting salvors' rights and abilities, the ASA
destroyed the romance of exploration and the discovery of hidden
treasures, as now, salvors receive no reward, title, or enjoyment from
thei endeavors. Additionally, as a result of the resources spent liti-
gating these claims, the public suffers because states lose some of the
funding that could be used to preserve and protect historic
ship wrecks.
B y applying a standard of implied abandonment with the high stan-
dard of clear and convincing evidence, courts still protect historic ship-
wreiks while also rewarding those that study and search for these
ships. Perhaps, when the Supreme Court handed down its ominous
one sentence guide to lower courts, "the meaning of abandoned under
the ASA conforms with its meaning under admiralty law, ' 316 this is
precisely what it intended.
Mary Ann Becker
316. California and State Lands Comm'n v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 508 (1998).
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